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1.0 Introduction 
 
China’s economic rise is one of the biggest events in the world since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The difference from being a poor and underdeveloped country under the dictatorship 
of Mao, to the reforms imposed by Deng Xiaoping and the massive economic growth, are 
almost unimaginable. China is now the second largest economy in the world and has become 
one of the most important countries in the international system. However, the introduction of 
these previously mentioned economic reforms has not led to a big introduction of political 
reforms in China. Democracy in China has been slower in coming than capitalism. There has 
been a massive pressure from the world, mostly “the West”, on China to push towards a path 
of democratization. For many, China can’t be fully incorporated in the world system before 
it’s a democracy.  
These views on the democratization of China follow much of the same logic as the democratic 
peace-theory. That is, if China becomes a democracy, it will be peaceful towards other 
democracies. This view is contested by the democratization and war-theory. As Mansfield and 
Snyder (1995: 36) write, pushing nuclear-armed great powers, like China, towards 
democratization is like spinning a roulette wheel, where many of the potential outcomes are 
likely to be undesirable.   
The theory that democratization can lead to a more aggressive state has been widely discussed 
by academics (Huntington 1968, Dahl 1971, Cain 1985, Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2001, 
2005). This theory has also often been mentioned by academics when specifically discussing 
the possible future democratization in China as well (Bachman 2000, Gilley 2004, Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005, Bass 2006, Rowen 2007, Shirk 2007, Wang 2008, Lind 2011). However, it 
is often mentioned in passing, and rarely discussed any further. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the debate about China’s democratic future, and if the 
democratization in China will lead to a more aggressive foreign policy and possibly war. 
Therefore, my research question is: Will democratization in China lead to a more aggressive 
foreign policy? 
 
 2 
 
This research question follows the logic of democratization and war-theory that states that 
new democracies are more aggressive than mature democracies and authoritarian regimes. 
From this theory, I have developed two hypotheses:  
My first hypothesis is: 
H1:“A weak rule of law, threatened elites, aggressive nationalism and a poorly 
regulated marketplace of ideas will promote an aggressive foreign policy in a 
democratization process in China”.  
My second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: “A well-developed rule of law and a well-regulated marketplace of ideas will 
hinder an aggressive foreign policy in a democratization process in China” 
The importance of understanding the consequences of democratization in China should be 
obvious. Experience with recent democratic transitions has not been an especially good one, 
and discussing possible democratization in one of the leading great powers in the world is 
important. Additionally, not since the crisis in 1989 has the consensus been stronger that the 
resilience of the CCP1 in the People’s Republic of China is approaching its limits (Nathan 
2013: 20). There seems to be a growing number of academics saying that China is at a 
“tipping point”2, and David Shambaugh wrote in a much-discussed article in The World Street 
Journal (06.03.2015) that “the endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun”. 
Consequently, discussing consequences of a possible democratization process in China is 
therefore highly relevant. 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. First, in my theory and methods chapter, I explain and 
elaborate on democratization and war-theory, and from this theory, derive my two hypotheses. 
The methods section of the thesis will focus on operationalizing my variables, and how I will 
conduct my empirical investigation. This chapter will consequently lay the framework for my 
thesis.  
Then follows the main chapter of this thesis, where I analyze the theory of democratization 
and war, based on my hypotheses. First, I identify if there are any threatened elites in China. 
Then I will analyze Chinas development of a rule of law. I will address the issues using 
                                                          
1 The Chinese Communist Party 
2 This is a reference to a cluster of articles in The Journal of Democracy, January 2013, named “China at the 
Tipping Point?” 
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quantitative data for the measurement of institutional strength and the rule of law, and show 
that the data from Polity and the Worldwide Governance Indicator are not in the shape I want 
them to be in. I then direct my focus on one of the most important institutions in 
democratization and war-theory, specifically the development of the Rule of Law in China. I 
will start with examining the development in post-reform China up to today. I will also 
discuss the most recent development, which some scholars call a “backlash against law”, and 
how this affects my hypotheses.   
 
I will then explore the nature of Chinese nationalism and see if it has some aggressive traits. I 
begin with the patriotic education campaign and see the change from the victor-narrative to 
the victim-narrative as it is important factor regarding when it comes to my hypotheses. From 
there I’ll go through various Diaoyu-island conflicts to see how the nationalism is directed 
towards Japan in China. A large portion of this exploration will be dedicated to the anti-
Japanese demonstrations in 2012, and I will here try to dissect what was actually said during 
these demonstrations.  
 
The last part of the empirical chapter focuses on the media in China. I begin with the 
commercialization of Chinese media in the post-reform era. This commercialization was the 
cause of two interesting developments regarding the Chinese media, namely a noticeable rise 
in investigative journalism and incredible media competition. I discuss how investigative 
journalism has affected professionalism in the Chinese media. In the end of this section I will 
see how the media has reported on different conflicts, specifically those involving the Diaoyu 
islands. This will show if the Chinese media are taking the role as a regulator as the theory of 
democratization and war says it has to do to mitigate the effect of nationalist myth-making 
and elite manipulation.  
 
The last chapter summarizes the findings and the conclusion of this thesis. My conclusion in 
this paper is that that democratization in China today would be dangerous and that it could 
lead China towards a more aggressive foreign policy, and possibly war, when looking at the 
domestic political dynamics put in play by democratization. There will be elites in China that 
will feel threatened by democratization, the rule of law in China is somewhat weak, there are 
in fact traits of aggressive nationalism in China towards Japan, and the media does not take up 
its role as a regulator in the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, the research done in this 
paper supports my first hypothesis.  
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2.0 Theory and Method 
 
The notion that democracies seldom, if ever, go to war against one another has been called as 
“close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy 1989: 88) and 
it has become conventional wisdom among Western policy-makers. This doctrine has long 
proven practical for presidents, especially of the United States. President Woodrow Wilson 
emphasized, in a war message to Congress on April 2, 1917 in Washington, that: “A steadfast 
concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No 
autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants” 
(Wilson, quoted in: Ikenberry et al. 2008: 53). 
 
This firm belief in the superiority of democracy has, in many respects, survived until this day. 
Former President Bill Clinton defended this belief in his 1994 ‘State of the Union Address’, 
arguing that “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support 
the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other” (Clinton, quoted 
in: McDonald 2009: 2). The promotion of democracy is also the key to understanding 
President George W. Bush’s struggle against Islamic fundamentalism after ‘9/11’. In his 2004 
‘State of the Union Address’, President Bush stated: “America is pursuing a forward strategy 
of freedom in the Middle East. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our 
aim is a democratic peace” (The Washington Post 20.01.2004).  
 
2.1 Democracy and democratization 
 
Before discussing the theory of democratization and war, I feel the need to clearly define what 
actually democracy and democratization is in this thesis. As Coppedge (2012: 11) writes in 
his book Democratization and Research Methods, one of biggest challenges with studying 
democratization has been reaching an agreement on what “democracy” actually is. There are 
hundreds of ways to define democracy3, and consequently, this paper will not go into detail 
about this discussion. Even though “democracy” is a contested concept, research on 
democratization is still possible if we are very clear on “what we mean by ’democracy’, so 
that we do not become entangled in semantic confusion” (Coppedge 2012: 13).   
                                                          
3 For a summary of 72 different characteristics of democracy, see Coppedge 2012: 15-16 
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With this in mind, the definition of democracy that will be used in this thesis will be a so-
called thin and procedural definition. This view of democracy is well represented by 
Huntington and Dahl. 
Huntington has probably one of the thinnest definitions of democracy. He defines democracy 
as a political system where “the most powerful collective decision makers are selected 
through fair, honest, and periodic election in which candidates freely compete for votes and in 
which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (Huntington 1991: 7).  
Huntington’s definition builds upon one of the most used definitions of democracy, Robert 
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (Dahl 1971). Dahl’s minimal definition of democracy has mainly 
eight institutional requirements (Dahl 1971: 3). These eight institutional requirements are as 
follows: (1) almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; (2) almost all adult citizens are 
eligible for public office; 3) political leaders have the right to compete for votes; (4) elections 
are free and fair; (5) all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other 
organizations; (6) all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; (7) diverse 
sources of information  about politics exist and are protected by law; and, (8) government 
policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.  
Dahl’s institutional requirements do seem to be a “thicker” definition than Huntington’s, as 
they also focus on freedoms, opportunities, and protections that democracy must provide to its 
citizens. However, as Huntington writes (1991: 7), his definition also “implies the existence 
of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are 
necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns”. 
With this in mind, this thesis will use Mansfield and Snyder’s definition of democracy, as it is 
short, to the point, and includes most of the elements from both Dahl and Huntington’s 
definitions. For Mansfield and Snyder, democracy is a political system where “authorities are 
accountable to the bulk of the population through fair, regular, and competitive elections. 
Elected officials set government policies, including foreign and military policy, and act 
through bureaucratic agents who are subjected to the law” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 41).  
This definition of democracy also gives a good indication about the definition of 
democratization. Since popular elections are central to the definition of democracy adopted 
for this thesis, then the central point of democratization would be “the replacement of a 
government that was not chosen this way by one that is selected in a free, open, and fair 
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election” (Huntington 1991: 9). In addition, the focus on elections is central to the 
democratization and war-theory as well, and Mansfield and Snyder write that their theory 
applies to countries “that either have held meaningful elections or anticipate imminent 
elections” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 41).  
Consequently, in this thesis, the definition of democratization will follow Huntington’s 
definition, and therefore is define as mainly the opening up of public participation in politics 
in the way of free and open elections. 
As I have now clearly stated the definition on democracy and democratization, I will now turn 
to democratization and war-theory. 
2.2 Democratization and war 
 
The democratic peace-theory claims that democratic states don’t fight war with each other 
because they recognize one another, and refuse to fight on that basis4. This notion is what 
Mansfield and Snyder challenge. They write:  
“It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies 
would be a safer and preferable for the United States. However, countries do not 
become mature democracies overnight” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 5).  
There are big differences between mature democracies and immature ones, when it comes to 
policy-outcomes. This is also something noted and discussed by scholars of the democratic 
peace-theory. For example, Maoz and Russett (1993: 636) concluded that norms and 
institutions take time to develop, and that “newly created democracies in Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere may still experience some significant amount of interstate conflict while their 
political systems are in the process of transition to democracy”. Therefore, in immature 
democracies, where the norms and the institutions are not fully developed, there would not be 
the democratic peace-outcome. Risse-Kappen (1995: 495) also writes that “stable democratic 
                                                          
4 How can we explain the ‘democratic peace’? The literature has developed around two primary variants of 
democratic peace theory. They are namely normative/cultural and structural theories. These divisions can be 
discussed, since they don’t explain the democratic peace alone, and they are really complementary as 
cultural/norms influence the creation and evolution of political institutions, and institutions shape culture 
(Russett and Oneal 2001: 53). However, it seems that the structural/norms typology is being used in the 
literature for analytic convenience (Owen 1994: 92).   
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systems constitute the main inhabitants of the ‘island of democratic peace’,” and these 
systems are therefore less likely to enter into conflict with one another.  
The democratic peace-theorists do therefore acknowledge that there is the possibility of 
conflict during a democratic transition. However, Mansfield and Snyder go further, and 
hypothesize that countries in a transitional phase of democratization become more aggressive 
and war-prone than mature democracies and autocracies, and that democratizing states do 
fight wars with democratic states (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, 2005).  
To test this hypothesis, Mansfield and Snyder use the same database that is typically used to 
study the democratic peace. In this statistical test, they find considerable evidence for the 
generalization that democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than are mature 
democracies and stable autocracies (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Chapter 5 and 6).  
Why does democratization increase the chance of war? From democratization and war-theory, 
we can identify four main variables: (1) a threatened elite; (2) weak institutions; (3) 
aggressive nationalism; and (4) an poorly regulated marketplace of ideas. These are also the 
intervening variables in my hypotheses, and the ones I will now direct my attention to.  
2.2.1 Institutional Weakness  
 
In a democracy, institutions are seen as one of the main reasons as to why democracies are 
more peaceful than other countries. Democratic political institutions allow the people a say in 
decisions of war and peace. Since democratic institutions force leaders to mobilize public and 
legislative support for war, it makes fast and not thought-through decisions very unlikely, and 
also since this process takes time, the institutions creates time to find a peaceful solution 
(Risse-Kappen 1995: 498). The average voter in mature democracies is both more informed 
and more likely to acquire accurate information and also punish reckless politicians through 
elections.  
However, these solutions and institutions emerge only in the very long run (Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995: 22). In newly democratizing states with weak institutions, these institutional 
checks are missing, and these institutions fail to produce the same policy outcomes as they 
would in strong institutions as there is in mature democracies. As Samuel Huntington (1968: 
5) noted, one of the key problems with political development is that there is a gap between 
high levels of political participation and poorly integrated institutions. Robert Dahl (1971: 36) 
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emphasized the importance of establishing institutions for competitive politics prior to 
holding unfettered mass elections. When suffrage was extended before the establishing of 
institutions that regulated political competition, transitions were prone to conflict (Dahl 1971: 
38).  Consequently, when autocracies collapse and the transition towards democracy begins, 
there is often a gap where autocratic institutions lose their effectiveness before the democratic 
ones have been built up (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 59). In other words, there is a period 
where state institutions are extremely weak and are incapable of doing the job they were 
created for, and there will be a strong pressure from the population that insists on universal 
suffrage and election early on in the process, no matter the state the institutions are in. 
The way political participation is handled in an immature democracy with weak institutions 
are therefore often a parody of a mature and institutionalized democracy. As Mansfield and 
Snyder write:  
“In newly democratizing states without strong parties, independent courts, a free press, 
and untainted electoral procedures, there is no reason to expect that mass politics will 
produce the same impact on foreign policy as it does in mature democracies” 
(Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 22) 
The fact that there will be disorganized political parties, corrupt bureaucracies, and partial 
media monopolies will change the outcome in newly democratizing states away from the 
outcomes that would have come in mature democracies. And most importantly, these 
institutions are not mature enough to handle the conflicts that will arise between different 
social groups and elites when there is an opening of political participation. Consequently, 
these institutions are weak as a conflict resolution mechanism (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 
59-60).  
However, this is evitable. In many transitions, the new regime could use the strong 
bureaucratic institutions of the previous regime. In these situations, the transition is smoother 
and does not necessarily create a period without any strong institutions present in the state 
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 59). In other words, where there are strong institutions present 
in the face of democratization, the transitions are more likely to be “peaceful” and avoid the 
development of the elements described in the democratization and war-theory.  
Consequently, if there are weak institutions present before a state is opening up for popular 
participation in politics, this could lead to the short-run thinking and reckless policymaking 
that leads to war. One of the main problems with the institutions in an immature democracy is 
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that they are not able to act as an effective conflict resolution mechanism as the political 
spectrum widens because of democratization. If there are effective conflict resolution 
mechanisms in place, these mechanisms can “confront the challenges of integrating the 
conflicting interests unleashed by universal suffrage” (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 59). 
However, if these mechanisms are missing, the widening of the political spectrum has the 
potential to lead to a nationalistic bidding war between different social and elite groups. 
Consequently, an effective rule of law that is able to act as an effective conflict resolution 
mechanism is important, and therefore is my first intervening variable rule of law. The choice 
to explore the development of a rule of law in China, and to omit other institutions, will be 
discussed in the following methods section. 
2.2.2 Threatened Elites 
 
In democratization and war-theory, elites have a central role to the process of 
democratization. Simply put, not everyone ends up being better off by democratic reforms. 
Certain social groups, including many powerful ones, are likely to be losers from 
democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 24). Many elites and social groups will 
therefore try to hinder this development or try everything in their power to protect their 
interests in an environment of increased political participation.  
Using whatever resources they retain, many elites will attempt to mobilize allies to pursue 
their own political interests in the face of democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 28). 
Often it is not one elite group interest that is threatened, but many. Therefore, the mobilization 
for mass support takes place in a highly competitive environment. Democratization leads to a 
more diverse political environment with different social group coming into the political 
debate. These groups often have diverse and potentially incompatible interests (Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995: 26). The effective conflict resolution mechanisms engrained in fully mature 
democracies, such as a developed rule of law, are able to quell this competition by integrating 
the diverse interests of numerous social groups. However, in an immature democracy where 
the institutions that regulate competition is not in place, “the wide spread of politically 
mobilized social interests characteristic of a transition to democracy may make the formation 
of stable coalitions extremely difficult” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 26).  
The differing ideals of elites and social groups in a newly democratizing state will inevitably 
become problematic, as they will enter into a political deadlock with other elites and social 
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groups (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 31). This leads to a difficult political situation, where 
coming to a mutual agreement becomes almost impossible, due to the fact that different social 
groups and elites will inevitably use everything in their power to prevent political decisions 
that go against their own interests. Distrust leads to a lack of compromise, as losing any sort 
of political ground may “lead down a slippery slope toward social extinction” (Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995: 28), which inevitably creates a political impasse between these same groups.   
This political stalemate, and the strategies adopted by social groups and elites alike to settle 
this impasse, breeds the short-run thinking and reckless policymaking that leads to war. To 
survive an era of democratization, the elite must attract popular support, and this is often done 
through the use of nationalist rhetoric (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 303).  
Consequently, my second intervening variable for my thesis is threatened elites. If there are 
no elites in China that are threatened by democratization, the possibility for a war would 
drastically go down. 
 
2.2.3 Nationalism 
 
As seen, weak institutions to handle conflict creates a political impasse that becomes 
increasingly difficult to resolve. One of the best escape mechanisms of the political impasse 
of democratization is nationalism. 
When the interests of the elite are threatened by democratization, there will be a big incentive 
to play the nationalist card in an effort to try to attract popular support. The nationalist card 
will not only be played when powerful groups need popular support, but also when they want 
to avoid giving away any real political power to the average citizen (Snyder 2000: 32). 
Nationalism provides the elites a doctrine so that they can rule in the name of the people and 
not necessary by the people. Nationalism is therefore a way for elites to gain popular support 
without necessarily becoming fully democratic (Snyder 2000: 36).  
The opportunity to play the nationalist card to get popular support is also open for other elites, 
which is problematic due to the fact that different interests among elites often trigger 
nationalist bidding wars (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 303). This bidding war can get fast out 
of the control of elites, and they can trigger policies that are aggressive and expansionist.  
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For example, in Germany, elites were pressured to outbid other interests in a nationalist 
bidding war, which brought the country into two wars over Morocco and towards a decision 
to launch a preventive war in 1914 (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 303). Nationalism can 
therefore be a source of aggression in newly democratizing states, where elites can use 
nationalism to push the country towards an expansionist and aggressive policy if this is in 
their interests. However, nationalism also has the potential to take on a life of its own, and 
push elites and political leaders towards this policy without meaning to do so.  
Therefore, one of the sources of war in a democratization process is the ability of elites to 
play the nationalist card. It is therefore important for this thesis to examine if there is an 
opportunity for elites to play the nationalist card in China, and if this is a nationalism that can 
lead China into an aggressive and expansionist path. The nature of Chinese nationalism will 
therefore be important in order to identify any and expansionist traits. To see if Chinese 
nationalism is aggressive is therefore important, and therefore is my third intervening variable 
nationalism.  
 
2.2.4 The media 
 
Early on in a democratization process, there is usually an increase in free speech, and freedom 
of press. Among many human rights activists, an increase in free speech is undoubtedly a 
good thing in a democratization process, as this would “reduce the ability of ruling elites to 
promote nationalist thinking, since critics are better able to scrutinize and refute incorrect, 
dangerous ideas” (Snyder 2000: 56). This is central to the marketplace of ideas. 
  
The marketplace of ideas has long held a central place in liberal political philosophy. The 
marketplace of ideas is an analogy that ideas take the place of goods and services in an 
imagined market. The notion in the marketplace of ideas is that ideas, like goods and services, 
should be exposed to free competition, with the better ideas winning over the bad ones. This 
classical liberal view comes from John Stuart Mill’s argument that truth is most likely to 
emerge from a no-holds-barred debate (Snyder 2000: 56). 
  
Snyder and Ballentine note (1996: 12) that a no-hold-barred debate may reveal factual 
inaccuracies and logical contradictions is probably true in a perfect competition in the 
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marketplace of ideas. A perfect competition in the marketplace of ideas is for them “a 
situation of no monopolies of information or media access, low barriers to entry, full exposure 
of all consumers to the full range of ideas, the confrontation of ideas in common forums, and 
public scrutiny of faction and causal claims by knowledgeable experts” (Snyder and 
Ballentine 1996: 12, footnote 23).  
 
However, when it comes to newly democratizing states, the opening up of free speech and 
freedom of press, and unconstrained debates, does not guarantee that “superior” ideas win in a 
marketplace of ideas. This is because “democratizing states are likely to have highly 
imperfect political marketplaces where nationalist myths are fueled rather than refuted” 
(Snyder 1999: 56) and because the “marketplace of ideas in newly democratizing states often 
mirrors that of a young , poorly regulated industry, where the barriers to entry are falling, 
competition is imperfect, and oligopolistic elites exploit partial media monopolies in intense 
competition to win mass support in a segmented market” (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 14). 
Therefore, with poor or absent regulatory institutions, suppliers in the marketplace of ideas 
are tempted to trade not in fact, but rather to what turns a profit. In this situation, if the 
marketplace of ideas is not well-regulated, an increase in free speech and freedom of press 
can often lead to outbursts of nationalist mythmaking and “false advertising” by threatened 
elites (Snyder 2000: 57).  
Well-regulated marketplace of ideas consequently have the benefit of institutions and 
mechanisms that work to correct errors in a newly democratizing state. If these mechanisms 
are missing, there is an opportunity for elites to create nationalist myths and to use “false 
advertising” to attract popular support in a bidding war with other elites. This “false 
advertisement” will not be stopped by experts or by an open debate, in which the falsity of the 
advertisement is scrutinized and exposed, due to weak mechanisms. These mechanisms 
include professional journalists that have training in “the verification of sources and 
separation of fact from opinion, and the development of expert evaluative institutions whose 
prestige depends on maintaining a reputation for objectivity” (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 
22). If these mechanisms are present, they can effectively mitigate the propagation of 
falsifiable nationalist myths and force competing arguments to confront each other, which 
allows the public to evaluate the foundation of policies and their consequences (Snyder and 
Ballentine 1996: 22). Consequently, as Snyder and Ballentine write (1996: 6), “just as 
economic competition produces socially beneficial results only in a well-institutionalized 
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marketplace, where the monopolies and false advertising are counteracted, so too increased 
debate in the political marketplace leads to better outcomes only when there are mechanism to 
correct market imperfections”. 
Therefore, one of the most important mechanisms in a well-regulated marketplace of ideas is 
a professional media, as their fact-checking is important in the opposition of the manipulation, 
false advertising, and nationalist mythmaking of threatened elites. A professional media that 
can be objective and inform the public with a balanced view will therefore be important, as it 
can reveal factual inaccuracies, contradictions and the cost of acting on their implications 
(Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 12). However, if these mechanisms are missing, then the 
likelihood of nationalist mythmaking that inevitably promotes conflict increases. To see if the 
Chinese media can have this role as a check towards the elite’s manipulation and nationalist 
myth making will therefore be important. Consequently, to see if the media that can be a 
regulator in the marketplace of ideas is therefore important.  
 
2.3 My hypotheses 
  
In the democratization and war theory, I have found four important factors to explain both 
how and why the process of democratization can act as a promotion of war. These four factors 
include: (1) a weak rule of law; (2) threatened elites; (3) aggressive nationalism; and (4) a 
poorly regulated marketplace of ideas. From these four identified factors, I have developed 
and proposed two separate, but related hypotheses. My first hypothesis is as follows:  
H1:“A weak rule of law, threatened elites, aggressive nationalism and a poorly 
regulated marketplace of ideas will promote an aggressive foreign policy in a 
democratization process in China”.  
My second hypothesis is:  
H2: “A well-developed rule of law, and a well-regulated marketplace of ideas, will 
hinder an aggressive foreign policy in a democratization process in China” 
These two hypotheses are in direct, empirical competition, as they illustrate two different 
outcomes when the values for the intervening variables take different values. These 
hypotheses give me the elements I require to answer my research question. They are 
conceptually and theoretically sound, and provide a solid framework for my analysis.   
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As you can see from my research question, my dependent variable, Y, is foreign policy, while 
my independent variable, X, is democratization, since I am looking at the effect 
democratization in China will have on the country’s foreign policy. 
The variables in my hypotheses are intervening variables that explain the relationship between 
X and Y. These variables, as seen above, are Z1 Rule of Law, Z2 Threatened elites, Z3 
Nationalism and Z4 the Media. 
Figure 1.1  
Z1 Rule of Law, Z2 Threatened elites, Z3 Nationalism and Z4 Media 
   
X: Democratization                                         Y: Foreign Policy 
 
2.4 Methods 
 
The previous section has laid down the main foundation of my thesis by identifying the 
independent variables and hypothesizing the causal relationship between them and the 
dependent variable. This next section will focus on how these variables will be 
operationalized and will set down the rules that guide my empirical investigation.  
Following Yin’s (2003:8) classification system of when to use each method, we do see that 
this thesis is a single case study of China. A case study is the appropriate choice, due to the 
fact that this thesis is using theory to understand an intrinsically important case (Van Evera 
1997: 55).  Even though some scholars rank case studies lower on the methodological 
hierarchy (Moses and Knutsen 2008: 52), case studies are common and have clear advantages 
over other methods. As Lijphart (1971: 691) writes: ”the great advantage of the case study is 
that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the 
research resources at the investigator’s disposal are relatively limited”. George and Bennett 
(2005: 21) also write that “case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in 
individual cases in detail. Within a single case, we can look at large number of intervening 
variables and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular 
causal mechanism or help identify what conditions present in a case activate the causal 
mechanism”.  
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This thesis will use process tracing. Process tracing compliments other research methods, and 
can help with theory testing and theory development together with other methods (George and 
Bennett 2005: 207). As a method, process tracing “explores the chain of events or the 
decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes” 
(Van Evera 1997: 64). This makes it possible for the researcher to go into detail about how 
some courses of events develop, and to explore the potentially causal relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable. Process tracing can also be used in predicting an 
outcome from a theory, if the theory generates or predicts causal processes that lead to an 
outcome. As George and Bennett (2005:217) write, “process-tracing evidence tests whether 
the observed processes among variables in a case match those predicted or implied by the 
theory”. Consequently, this makes process tracing an appropriate methodological choice for 
this thesis.  
As I have now clearly stated my hypotheses and the methods used in this thesis, I will now 
turn to the intervening variables and see how these will be operationalized and how I will 
conduct my empirical investigation. 
2.4.1 Rule of Law 
 
One of the key variables in democratization and war-theory is institutional strength. However, 
this thesis will primarily focus on the development of a rule of law in China as a mechanism 
for conflict resolution. 
The choice to focus on the rule of law contra institutional strength as a whole is due to the fact 
that I found the quantitative data sets available to measure institutional strength to be 
unsatisfactory. This will be discussed in greater detail at the beginning of the Rule of Law 
section of the analysis. However, shortly, for example using the Polity-data, which Mansfield 
and Snyder used in their research, was not an option for me. The variable used to measure 
domestic institutions has been excluded from recent Polity-datasets. Because of this, the only 
available datasets that include measurements of domestic institutions date back to 1992. Due 
to the fact that this thesis focuses on the post-1992-period and more recent developments, this 
data is unsatisfactory. 
To examine the development of political institutions in China, this research required a 
qualitative method. However, institutional strength is a very big topic. Mansfield and Snyder 
mention different types of intuitions, like bureaucrats or a police force that follows the law, 
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impartial and active election commissions, well-organized political parties, and a competent 
legislature, to mention some of them (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 59). To do a satisfactory 
analysis of all of those areas in Chinese politics was something that I concluded quite early on 
to be simply not possible in this thesis because of length restrictions and the lack of data. I 
consequently have decided to focus on one of the most important institutional features in 
democratization and war-theory, namely the development of a rule of law.  
When discussing the rule of law, many political scientists do not really come up with an 
answer regarding what kind of rule of law they are actually discussing5, which is obviously a 
problem. When defining the rule of law, this paper will base its definition on Huntington’s 
criteria for political institutionalization. Huntington writes that “an effective organization 
requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the groups and 
on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries” (Huntington 
1968: 22). Consequently, a rule of law, in this sense, is a mechanism that is able to set 
effective rules and framework to solve disputes that arise in a society.  
To guide my evaluation of the effectiveness of the rule of law in China, I will use Lon Fuller’s 
influential criteria for establishing a stable system of laws. He writes that law should be 
general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, stable, enforceable, and capable of being 
followed (Fuller 1964: 39). Fuller notes that a total failure in the fulfillment of these elements 
does not simply result in a bad system of law, “it results in something that is not properly 
called a legal system at all” (Ibid).  
Consequently, my paper will look at the rule of law as a conflict resolution mechanism, and 
will evaluate this mechanism based on Fuller’s criteria for a stable legal system.   
The validity of the findings of this thesis then come into question due to my choice of 
narrowing my intervening variable regarding institutions to focus solely on the development 
of a rule of law. I argue that this is not the case. Of course, the findings would not include an 
analysis of all the institutions mentioned in democratization and war-theory. Instead, this 
thesis will include a deep analysis of one of the most important institutional features of the 
democratization and war-theory. As previously mentioned, the lack of effective conflict 
resolution mechanisms early on in a democratization process is one of the main reasons that 
                                                          
5 For example, Carothers mentioned that the lack of a definition of the rule of law was a problem in a 
sequencing debate with, for example, Snyder and Fukuyama in 2007. Listen to “Debating the “Sequencing 
Fallacy”” available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/01/30/debating-sequencing-fallacy/qei. 
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creates the various dynamics that encourage belligerence abroad. Consequently, the rule of 
law as a conflict resolution mechanism helps to resolve the conflicts of interests stemming 
from growing demands for political participation, and is in democratization and war-theory 
one of the most important institutional features that can mitigate the effects democratization 
has on encouraging aggressive foreign policy.  
Because of this, my choice to focus on the rule of law is a defensible one and this focus will 
not make my findings any less valid.  
  
2.4.2 Nationalism 
 
What actually is nationalism, and what is aggressive nationalism? Before examining Chinese 
nationalism, clear definitions of both these terms and an appropriate vocabulary are necessary. 
Nationalism can be a difficult concept to define. Different people have different 
understandings and ideas of what nationalism consists of. However, the definition of 
nationalism that is most widely used by scholars is Ernest Gellner’s definition. In his book 
Nations and Nationalism, Gellner defines nationalism as a: “political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1983: 1). According to this 
definition, the state, the organization that exercises sovereign authority over a given territory, 
and the nation, defined as a group of people who feel they share a common culture, should 
cover the same area. Furthermore, Gellner (1981:1) notes that “nationalist sentiment is the 
feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused 
by its fulfillment”. It is a clear and quite simple definition, and as Snyder (2000: 22) writes, 
“this formulation is theoretically clear and historically plausible”. Because of this, Gellner’s 
definition will also be used in this thesis. 
 
Is nationalism, in itself, aggressive? Van Evera (1994: 5) noted in his article Hypotheses on 
Nationalism and War that many scholars have taken “the war-causing character of 
nationalism for granted”, and have then automatically assumed that nationalism is, in itself, 
aggressive. This was noted by Anthony Smith in his book Theories of Nationalism, in which 
he states that: “the prevailing image of nationalism in the West today is mainly negative” 
(Smith 1983: 8). However, the effects of nationalism on the probability of war are varied. 
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Meaning, some types of nationalism are more aggressive than others (Van Evera 1994: 7, 
Schrock-Jacobsen 2012: 825). 
Research on the effects of nationalism on the probability of war is varied and focuses on 
numerous topics. However, as research done by Van Evera shows, the effect that nationalism 
has on war does “depend heavily on the beliefs of nationalist movement, especially their self-
image and their image of their neighbors” (Van Evera 1994: 26). 
In this thesis, if nationalists “portray other nations as more threatening, more implacable, 
more culpable for historic wrongs, yet also more easily countered by resolute opposition than 
they really are” (Snyder 2000: 67), we can define this as aggressive nationalism. It plays on 
the insecurity of the nation, while also being overly optimistic about militant solutions. This 
view suggests a potential bidding war between threatened elites in a democratization process. 
If people believe that their national territory and identity, reputation, and self-rule are 
endangered by “others” and that military action is an acceptable solution, they could push a 
bidding war between threatened elites towards initiating or continuing aggressive foreign 
policies to achieve the state’s nationalistic objectives. 
Because of the fact that people can have different ideas about what nationalism truly is, this 
can lead to problems on how to measure nationalism, and specifically regarding this thesis, 
how to measure if Chinese nationalism has aggressive traits. However, as Magnus Rom 
Jensen notes (2011: 13-16), nationalism can be measured by focusing on the actions of people 
that are motivated by nationalistic sentiments. Actions such as demonstrations, books, films 
etc. can be nationalistic actions that express an underlying nationalistic sentiment. We can 
therefore measure nationalism by examining these actions, and selecting actions that are 
obviously a response to a violation of the nationalistic principle. In other words, this thesis 
will focus on nationalistic anger, and not nationalistic satisfaction. 
Consequently, this paper will look at different types of nationalistic actions to measure if 
nationalism in China has some aggressive traits, and to what extent. 
This thesis will also focus on nationalistic actions towards Japan. This is a natural choice. 
First, nationalistic actions towards Japan have the highest probability of being aggressive, 
and, consequently, focusing on Japan is an easy test to see if Chinese nationalism has some 
aggressive traits. In addition, since the 1970s, most demonstrations with underlying 
nationalistic sentiment in China have been directed at Japan.  
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Second, focusing on nationalistic actions that target Japan is highly policy relevant. Japan is 
the third biggest economy in the world and a growing tension between China and Japan in 
recent years can be observed. 
2.4.3 Media 
 
As I aim to examine the extent to which the Chinese media can act as a regulator in the 
marketplace of ideas, I must, at the outset, address certain issues. Firstly, Chinese media is a 
vast landscape with many different actors, including television, newspapers, radio, and more. 
Due to their availability, this thesis will focus on newspapers, both in print and online.  
Focusing on the print and online versions of newspapers, and no other media platforms, 
including television and radio, is also defendable when looking at media consumption in 
China. The three biggest sources of information in China are the internet (including online 
versions of newspapers), television, and print newspapers, in that order (Hu Yong et al. 2012: 
34). Consequently, I will be focusing on one of the biggest media platforms in China.  
Secondly, I do not know the Chinese language. This is obviously an issue when it comes to 
doing a good analysis of Chinese media. I spent an incredible amount of time gathering 
primary sources from a Chinese newspaper database.  However, when I found out the costs of 
translating the articles, I had to turn away from that. I also tried keyword searches in these 
articles, but found that to be very unreliable. In the end, I ended up with mostly articles from 
the English versions of Chinese newspapers, as well as translations done by different, reliable 
internet sites that specialize in translations, for example, China Digital Times, China File, Tea 
Leaf Nation, and Sinocism. I have also relied on research conducted by Chinese and Western 
scholars. Consequently, my findings are based on a solid foundation of primary and secondary 
sources.   
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3.0 Analysis 
 
As the theory-chapter shows, I have specified four intervening variables that need to be 
discussed in order to address and answer my research question. These four intervening 
variables are: (1) threatened elites; (2) rule of law; (3) nationalism; and, (4) the media. In this 
main chapter of the thesis, I’ll go through each of these variables and measure the values of 
these variables in China. 
At first, I will promptly discuss the presence of threatened elites in China. This section will be 
quite short as it is not controversial to conclude that there are, in fact, elites in current China 
that would feel threatened by democratization. I will also in this section show that there will 
also be elites and social groups that would welcome democratization. One example of this in 
recent times is Bo Xilai. 
From there, I direct my attention towards the rule of law in China. I will briefly discuss the 
quantitative data regarding institutional strength, before going into detail about the 
development of a rule of law in China, as it is one of the most important institutions that 
regulate conflict between different elite and social groups.  
From there I’ll discuss nationalism in China. This is an important element, as it suggests how 
the eventual playing of the nationalist card by elites would play out in a democratization 
process in China. An important question here is how aggressive is Chinese nationalism? 
Consequently, how attractive and dangerous is playing the nationalist card in China? 
The last intervening variable that will be discussed is the media in China. The media is an 
important check against elite manipulation, and can be an important variable to mitigate the 
dangers of war in a democratization process. Consequently, to see if the media can take up the 
role of regulator in the marketplace of ideas in a democratization process is therefore 
important, and especially towards nationalistic issues in China.  
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3.1 Threatened Elites 
 
I will not dedicate a lot of space to this intervening variable. This is not because it is a less 
important variable, but it is more that it is not a controversial conclusion to say that there will 
probably be some elite or social groups that will feel threatened by a democratization process 
in China. Few authoritarian rulers in history have accepted to cede their power (Minxin Pei 
2007: 55), and it is unlikely that all elite-groups will accept this easily. Corruption can be an 
example that there are elite-groups that are threatened. In short, the corrupt fear democracy. 
Holders of power and the rich are afraid of openness, transparency, revelations, journalist 
interviews, public condemnation, direct elections, legislatures, hearings, testimonies, public 
trials and the leaking of insider scandals (Gilley 2004: 57).  Corrupted elites are afraid of the 
witch hunt that can follow democratization. 
Corruption is a big problem in China. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index ranks China as the hundredth most corrupt nation out of the 174 nations in the world 
(Transparency International 2014). It is one of the biggest challenges to the legitimacy of the 
CCP, and corruption scandals are quite common in China. To illustrate the problems of 
corruption in China, we can look at one of the most extreme cases, specifically former deputy 
chief engineer at the Ministry of Railways, Zhang Shuguang. Zhang was regarded as the 
“father of China’s high-speed railways” (Asia Times 08.03.2011), and it was reported that he 
had stashed away $ 2,8 billion in Swiss and US bank accounts, while simultaneously owning 
three luxury homes in Los Angeles (Forbes 01.08.2011). He did this as a prefecture-level 
official, with an official monthly salary of just $1240 (Ibid).  
The problems of corruption in China spans over many sectors. The sectors considered high-
risk with regards to corruption are land acquisition, the financial sector, state-owned 
enterprises, the pharmaceutical industry, and infrastructure projects (Minxin Pei 2008: 238-
241). One example of corruption in the infrastructure sector is the previous mentioned case of 
Zhang Shuguang. However, the most well-known case is that of Liu Zhijun. Liu Zhijun was 
the Railway Minster of China from 2003 to 2011, and did oversee a multiple of projects and 
Liu personally campaigned for the construction of numerous high-speed railways (New York 
Times 12.02.2011). This rapid expansion “left the Ministry of Railways saddled with debts of 
nearly $ 645 billion” (New York Times 10.04.2013). The investigation of his case “resulted in 
the recovery of almost 350 flats and more than 900 million yuan” (South China Morning Post 
11.06.2011), and he was sentenced for “using his position of influence to help business 
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associates win promotions and project contracts, and of accepting 64.6 million yuan in 
unspecified bribes between 1986 and 2011” (South China Morning Post 11.06.2011).  
The problems with corruption is also the case in the absolute top of the CCP. This can be 
illustrated with the recent anti-corruption campaign that Xi Jinping launched after he took 
office in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, 182 000 party officials on various levels had been 
investigated. This investigation led to the arrests of “32 leaders who rank at the level of vice 
minister or above, including five leaders who are members of the 18th Central Committee of 
the CCP” (Cheng Li and McElveen 2014). Just how many of these investigations were 
politically motivated remains unclear. It does however illustrate that corruption is a problem 
that CCP takes seriously, and that it is a problem from lower ranking officials to the top of the 
CCP.   
Corrupt officials and members in the high-risk industrial sectors of the Chinese economy are 
examples of elite groups that would feel threatened by democratization.  
However, there are also numerous elite and social groups that would benefit from a 
democratization process, and people like for example Bo Xilai is a good example of this. Bo 
Xilai was “aggressively and unprecedentedly campaigned to obtain a seat in the next 
Politburo Standing Committee” (Cheng Li 2012: 603). Bo Xilai’s policies in Chongqing won 
wide populist support, and especially by the poor. Bo Xilai spent “billions of pounds on low 
income housing”, which was considered a major triumph (The Telegraph 17.04.2012). When 
Bo Xilai was purged from his position, there was a short lived demonstration in Chongqing in 
support for him (Ibid). Bo Xilai was also voted the “man of the year” in 2009 in an online poll 
by People’s Daily (Cheng Li 2010: 22).  
 
I feel that a conclusion that says that there are elites in China that are threatened by 
democratization is not controversial. There are elite and social groups in China that would be 
afraid of the uncertainties that a democratic breakthrough would bring, while there are 
simultaneously elite and social groups that would equally benefit from a democratization 
process. Because of this, the initial phase of democratization in China would most likely be a 
highly competitive environment where threatened elite and social groups would fight for 
popular support with themselves as well as with elite and social groups that would welcome 
democratization in China. This would lead to the same political impasse described in 
democratization and war-theory. 
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Therefore, the way in which institutions can act as conflict resolution mechanisms between 
threatened elites and rising social groups is important, and will be discussed in the following 
section.  
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3.2 Rule of Law 
 
As noted in the theory-chapter, one of the main variables in the theory of democratization and 
war is institutional strength. Mansfield and Snyder write that “In newly democratizing states 
without strong parties, independent courts, a free press, and untainted electoral procedures, 
there is no reason to expect that mass politics will produce the same impact on foreign policy 
as it does in mature democracies” (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 22). 
This section will focus primarily on a specific institutional feature, namely the development 
of a rule of law in China. This institutional feature will be discussed on the basis of its 
importance as one of the preconditions for sequencing democracy successfully and 
consequently mitigate the danger of war in a democratization process as described by 
Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 59). However, before directing my focus in this, I will first 
discuss the different quantitative datasets regarding institutional strength, namely the Polity-
dataset and the Worldwide Governance Index, both of which are frequently used by scholars.  
From there, I will discuss in depth the impact of the rule of law as my dependent variable. The 
causal link between, for example, the media and foreign policy in democratization is probably 
easier to see than the link between the rule of law and foreign policy. However, the rule of 
law is important in the theory of democratization and war, and one of the most important 
features of the sequencing debate. The rule of law helps to cope with increased political 
participation, as it instills “guarantees that reassure all constituencies while the reformers 
negotiate golden parachutes with old elites to induce them to relinquish power” (Mansfield 
and Snyder 2007: 8). 
 
3.2.1 Quantitative measures of Institutional strength 
 
Measuring institutional strength is a difficult task and there are few available datasets for 
doing so. However, in their research, Mansfield and Snyder have used Gurr’s method for 
calculating domestic concentration, alongside the Worldwide Governance Indicator, which 
has variables that measure institutional strengths.  
By using Gurr’s method for calculating domestic concentration, we see that China scores a 5 
on the composite index. Following the results presented by Mansfield and Snyder, they note 
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that an incomplete democratization with a level of domestic concentration that is below 5 is 
“more likely to stimulate war than any other set of conditions that we consider” (Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005: 111). Using this index, we therefore see that China is just on the border 
when it comes to what Mansfield and Snyder would define as dangerously weak institutions. 
However, the predicted probability of war is quite low in face with democratization with this 
amount of institutional strength based on the variable from the Polity II-data. However, there 
are problems with using this index, primarily because it is outdated. The variable used to 
measure domestic institutions has not been added to the most recent Polity-datasets. Jennifer 
Lind (2011) writes that the institutions in China, based on this index, are robust enough to go 
through a process of democratization. When discussing that the data is quite dated, Lind 
argues that it is unlikely that the domestic concentration scores have changed in a negative 
directive in China (Lind 2011: 431). Lind writes that “China appears to be deepening the rule 
of law and strengthening its political institutions” (Ibid: 430). Although it is tempting to make 
the same conclusion, especially since it is not possible to recreate the previous variable from 
the new Polity, I find this to be unsatisfactory. 
In an article from 2012, Mansfield and Snyder use the Worldwide Governance Indicator to 
measure government effectiveness in countries that experienced popular uprisings during the 
Arab Spring (2012: 727). The Government Effectiveness in the Worldwide Governance 
Indicator captures the “perceptions of quality of public services, the quality of civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” 
(Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010: 4). 
Using this, China ranked in the 60th percentile - the same level as Tunisia prior to the Arab 
Spring. Tunisia was seen as having relatively strong institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 2012: 
738).  
However, as Mansfield and Snyder note, these estimates should be treated with some 
skepticism as they “reflect individuals’ perceptions on government effectiveness and because 
factors being assessed do not exhaust the institutions needed to manage social change and 
political mobilization” (Mansfield and Snyder 2012: 727). The Worldwide Governance 
Indicator is based on several hundreds of variables that are obtained from 31 different data 
sources, which include non-governmental organizations, commercial business information 
providers, and public sector organizations worldwide (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 
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2). To go to these data sources directly to uncover their methodology is incredibly difficult. I 
have contacted many of them to no avail. I can further discuss my choice of not using these 
indexes by using the variable “rule of law” on China from the data. Using the Worldwide 
Governance Indicator shows us that China scores a 41.8 on the percentile rank, which is lower 
than Egypt, and just above Vietnam (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011). The “rule of 
law” variable in the Worldwide Governance Indicator measures “perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence” (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). Using this variable, we can 
conclude that the development of a rule of law in China can therefore been seen as below 
average, as compared to other countries.  
How much does this really tell us about the development of a rule of law in China?  As I have 
written, the Worldwide Governance Indicator is based on several hundreds of individual 
underlying variables, taken from a wide variety of existing data sources (Kaufman, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2011). The problem with these data sources is really noticeable when it comes 
to analyzing the data the “rule of law” variable is based on, as it shows that the data sources 
are extremely varied. For example, the score from Gallup World Poll is a 0,70 (from 0,00 to 
1,00) and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index has given China a 0,20 (Ibid). Another 
example of is that the dataset from Global Integrity Index that gives China a score of 76 (from 
0-100) on “Judicial Independence, Fairness, and Citizen Access to Justice”. One question that 
affects this score is “In law, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.” The answer to 
this is “Yes”, which is not wrong, as Judiciary independence is written in the Chinese 
constitution. However, a comment under this question, they have written: “Despite the law, in 
practice, there is no institutional independence”. This does not affect Chinas score as a whole. 
That question, which affect the total score Global Integrity Index gives China on the category 
on the development of a rule of law, and as an effect also the Worldwide Governance Index, 
are in my opinion saying not much about the real development of a rule of law in China.  It 
does show however that a deeper look into China’s development of a rule of law is necessary 
in order to answer my questions about institutional strength. It is possible that this discussion 
will lead to either a more positive or more negative view on the process than this index is 
showing.  
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The quantitative measures of institutional strength are therefore inadequate for my analysis. I 
therefore adopt a qualitative method to answer my questions, which will be focused on in the 
following section on the development of a rule of law.  
3.2.2 The rule of law in China 
 
One of these institutional featured which are a precondition to democracy, are the 
development of a rule of law (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 59). The rule of law is one of the 
preconditions for the peaceful development towards democracy, as it regulates competition 
between old and new social and elite groups in a process of democratization. A well-
established rule of law has therefore an important implication on my dependent variable in 
democratization, as it’s able to manage elite interest groups and newly politicized mass 
groups. The rule of law helps to resolve or suppress the conflicts of interests stemming from 
growing demands for political participation, which creates the various dynamics that 
encourage belligerence abroad.  
The path of institution building, including establishing rule of law, was a path that was 
followed by the US, England and Western Europe. It was also followed by recently 
democratized states, such as Mexico, Chile, and some Central European countries. The role of 
the rule of law can also be seen in previous East Asian transitions. In Taiwan and South 
Korea, the development of a rule of law was instrumental in making the transition as peaceful 
as possible6.  
 To see how the development of the rule of law in China is therefore important to judge their 
institutional strength and is in Mansfield and Snyder one of the most important institutional 
features that can mitigate against the effects democratization has on encouraging 
aggressiveness. Since I have concluded in the previous section that there are elites in China 
that will be threatened by a democratization, a developed rule of law that regulate competition 
between these elites is therefore incredible important in China. 
When discussing the importance of the “rule of law”, Mansfield and Snyder, and many others 
in the sequencing-debate7, do not really come up with an answer as to what kind of rule of law 
we are actually discussing. This is problematic, as “rule of law” has no clear and widely 
                                                          
6 See Zakaria 2003, Polterovich and Popov 2007, Gilley and Diamond 2008, and Peerenboom (2009) 
7 For more on the sequencing-debate see, for example, Carothers (2007), Berman (2007), Mansfield and Snyder 
(2007), and Peerenboom (2009). Also the discussion arranged by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
available at  http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/01/30/debating-sequencing-fallacy/qei 
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accepted definition. Among legal theorists, there is debate on the definition of “rule of law”, 
which is in no way within the scope of this thesis to examine8. In short, theories about the rule 
of law can roughly be divided into two main types: thin and thick. Thin definitions stresses 
the formal and instrumental aspects of rule of law. The thick conceptions of a rule of law link 
it up to particular forms of economic, social and political systems. For example, the dominant 
thick conception of the rule of law in “the West” is the liberal democratic version. In this 
concept, the essential ingredients to the rule of law are recognition and protection of civil 
liberties, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. There has also been considerable debate 
about the competing thick conceptions of rule of law within China, specifically. The liberal 
democratic is one of the concepts in this debate. Another is the socialist rule of law, which 
emphasizes “a nondemocratic system in which the Party plays a leading role; and an 
interpretation of rights that emphasizes stability, collective rights over individual rights, and 
the subsistence as the basic right rather than civil and political rights” (Peerenboom 2002: 3).  
As previously mentioned, this thesis will base its definition on Huntington’s criteria of 
political institutionalization. As Huntington notes, “an effective organization requires, at a 
minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the groups and on the 
procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries” (Huntington 1968: 
22). Consequently, a rule of law, in this sense, is a mechanism that is able to set effective 
rules and framework to solve disputes that arise in a society.  
I will use Lon Fuller’s influential criteria for establishing a stable system of laws as a guide to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the rule of law as a conflict resolution mechanism. These criteria 
include that law should be: general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being 
followed, stable, and enforced (Fuller 1964: 39). Consequently, this thesis will use a thin 
definition of a rule of law.  
I will first broadly discuss China’s development of a legal system, before concentrating on the 
most recent development and consequences this development has had on the strength of the 
legal institutions in China as conflict resolution mechanisms.   
 
                                                          
8 On more, read Peerenboom 2002: Chapter 3. 
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3.2.2.1 Historical background 
 
In the traditional Chinese legal system before the CCP came to power, the law was 
subordinate to the dominant political philosophy, Confucianism (Dreyer 2008: 166). 
However, Confucius realized that there will always be someone “who refuse to participate in 
creating a harmonious order and insist on pursuing their narrow self-interest in any manner 
possible. For such people, law and punishment are necessary” (Peerenboom 2002: 29). 
Consequently, in Confucianism, it was not advocated to completely abandon laws. However, 
the end goal was to create a society and environment in which laws would be needed as little 
as possible. Therefore, the application of law as a tool to rule wasn’t the first choice for 
Confucianism. Confucius thought that the people ruled by law won’t have the sense of shame, 
because it isn’t a civilized way to rule the people but the supplementary of moral. 
Consequently, we can argue that Confucian saw norms and law as mutually undermining 
instead of mutually reinforcing. 
However, the focus on an underdeveloped rule of law in China’s old history could be a 
cultural bias, and, therefore, I won’t go into it in detail. We should be cautious about using 
Confucianism as an explanatory factor for or against the development of the rule of law. 
Confucianism can be, and has been, used in many debates, in many different ways, to argue 
for and against things like modernization, industrialization, democracy, and of course, the rule 
of law.  
When the Communists came to power, the development of a legal system was given little 
attention, as they saw it as a “tool in the hands of the ruling class to oppress and exploit the 
workers and peasants and to inhibit the forces of progress” (Dreyer 2008: 165). During the 
revolution, from 1949 to 1956, there were small changes undertaken to the position of the rule 
of law. Under the Hundred Flowers period in 1956 and 1957, Mao tried to ease the tension 
that was building up in the Chinese society. Mao held a speech in 1956 where he urged to “let 
a hundred flowers bloom; let hundred schools of thought content” (Dreyer 2008: 88). Mao 
was inviting people to criticize the government. During this period, judges, lawyers and legal 
scholars were among the groups directing their criticism at the government: “laws were too 
vague and inconsistent; the emphasis on law as a tool of class struggle was wrongheaded; 
there was little or no separation between law and politics” (Peerenboom 2002: 45). Mao, 
possibly surprised by the amount of criticism, responded in a brutal way. The Anti-Rightist 
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Campaign in 1957 labeled many judges, lawyers, and academics as capitalists and rightists. 
They were persecuted and sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants. During a brief 
period in the 1960s, efforts were made to try to build up the legal institutions again, however, 
these efforts were stopped in 1966 when the Cultural Revolution started. The Cultural 
Revolution really destroyed the little that had been built up. During the Cultural Revolution, 
Mao Tse-tung called for the "smashing of Kung-chien-fa” (public security, procuratorate, and 
judicial organs)"' (Shao-Chuan Leng 1977: 356). Mao’s objective seemed to be to destroy all 
formal laws. For example, an article in the People’s Daily, from 1967, entitled “In Praise of 
Lawlessness” called for “the complete destruction of the "bourgeois" law so that the 
proletarian legal order could be established” (Shao-Chuan Leng 1977: 359). The entire legal 
system was one of the things the Red Guard aimed their terrible acts at. 
Effectively, the legal system was at ground zero when reforms began in the late 1970s (Saich 
2011: 161, Peerenboom 2008: 1). This is important to have in mind when we now direct our 
focus to the development of the rule of law in modern China, as we could argue that it is 
roughly a 30 year young process.  
   
3.2.2.2 Post-reform development  
 
When the reforms started in the end of the 1970s, and as economic reforms developed in the 
1980s, it became evident that there was a need for the development of a rule of law. 
Therefore, in the 1990s and the early 2000s, Party authorities embraced legal reforms. In 
1997, the Party adopted “rule of law” as a core Party slogan (Minzner 2012: 349). The 
environment for a legal system to evolve was completely different from the time of Mao and 
his eradication of all laws, and as a consequence, the legal system developed in an impressive 
way in the 90s and early 2000s. Many steps were taken, and China made remarkable progress 
in a short time in improving their legal system. Law schools reopened after they were shut 
down during the Cultural Revolution. People were sent on professional and academic 
exchanges in an attempt to aggressively import foreign legal concepts, and it were issued 
“hundreds of new statues and regulations, creating a comprehensive framework of civil, 
commercial, criminal, and administrative law” (Minzner 2013: 66). 
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Other examples of this rapid development towards a rule of law can be seen in the changes to 
legal education. From 1978 to 2005, the number of law schools in China increased from 5 to 
over 300 (He Weifang 2012: 138). In the 1970s and the 1980s, The National People’s 
Congress and the Standing Committee made over 160 different laws. By 1997, the number of 
persons employed in the various courts and the procurators’ offices exceeded 290,000 and 
210,000, respectively (Qianfan Zhang 2006: 138).  
The reasons for these reforms are many. Many Party leaders had personally suffered at the 
hands of the lawless acts of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, and they were 
ready to advocate a greater reliance on law. In addition, “legal reforms were seen as a way for 
the Party, whose image had been badly tarnished, to regain legitimacy both domestically and 
abroad” (Peerenboom 2002: 55). However, most importantly, these reforms and the 
strengthening of the rule of law were seen by the CCP as new mechanisms to resolve social 
conflicts that was mounting (Minzner 2013: 66), and as a way to help further economic 
development. “A market economy is a rule of law economy” became the rallying cry 
(Peerenboom 2002: 55). 
During the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the Chinese legal system seemed to be 
development steadily. This lead to a great deal of optimism regarding China and the rule of 
law, and this optimism peaked in 2003, around the same time as the Sun Zhigang-incident. 
Sun Zhigang was a migrant worker who went to Guangzhou to seek his fortune. However, he 
did not have a temporary residence card as required by law. At that time, the police could 
detain and deport anyone who did not have a valid residence card back to their home town, 
and they frequently did so, rounding up suspects in shakedown operations across the city. In 
Sun’s case, this ended in tragedy, as he was beaten to death while awaiting deportation. This 
resulted in media frenzy, and newspapers and websites throughout China were quick to 
publish the account. There was an explosion of outrage in chatrooms and bulletin boards, and 
legal experts called for the abolition of the custody and repatriation centers (China Digital 
Times 27.05.2005). 
 
One of the most interesting elements of this case was how it was challenged by legal experts 
in the aftermath. He Weifang, and five other legal scholars from Beijing, submitted a request 
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stating that the “Regulation for Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants”9 violated 
Article 37 of the PRC Constitution10 . The argument made by the petition was both 
compelling and solid, and those who drafted it were careful in their wording. As Keith Hand 
(2006: 145) notes, they were “using the law as a weapon to protect citizen rights and calling 
on the NPCSC11to exercise its constitutional supervisory function, just as Hu Jintao had 
instructed”. Using Hu Jintao’s own rhetoric was an important element to its success, since the 
new Party General Secretary had emphasized the supremacy of the PRC Constitution, and 
during a speech in 2002, he had called for education to both “improve the consciousness of 
observing the Constitution among the whole people”, and to ensure that the “broad masses 
know the Constitution is a legal weapon for safeguarding citizen rights” (Hand 2006: 144).  
This petition led to an abolition of the regulations a month later, bringing an end to legal 
discrimination against migrants.   
 
This outcome was seen as a huge success for legal reforms in China, and many thought of this 
as a milestone. The Southern Metropolitan Daily wrote that “The Sun Zhigang incident has 
become a milestone, a milestone in the history of citizen rights. We believe that this milestone 
will always remind us to cherish and strive for every right to which our citizens are entitled 
and to promote political civilization, the rule of law, and social progress in China” (Cited in 
Hand 2006: 129). Many legal professionals gave interviews regarding the incident, and 
furthered the idea that the incident had opened the way for change in China, and to push for 
further legal, political and social reforms in the future. He Weifang also noted, in the New 
York Times in 2003, that this was a better way of changing China than what they did during 
the Tiananmen Square Movement (New York Times 02.06.2003). When going back to the 
different thick definitions of a rule of law, the enthusiasm was heavily linked up to the liberal 
democratic concept of a rule of law. 
 
However, there are some important things to have in mind when it comes to the incident and 
what followed. Hand (2006: 132-135) argues that there was room for this challenge from the 
public and legal actors as the succession of power in 2002 just have happened and many 
                                                          
9 The State Council issued the Measures for the Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars in 
1982, which define beggars and other homeless people without a proper source of income as targets to be 
detained and repatriated to their home municipalities. 
10 For more on this, see Keith Hand 2006: 138-141 
11 The Standing Committee Of the National People’s Congress 
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thought there was a power-struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao12. It can be argued 
that the context in which the Sun Zhigang-incident occurred shows us that reform was 
dependent on social conditions, such as the politics of the leadership transition, and the recent 
SARS-controversy in 2002. Consequently, we can see that the enthusiasm and the receptivity 
of the leadership around this legal reform can be overestimated. As I will later discuss, the 
hope that these events could lead to greater legal and political reforms, as well as further 
development of the rule of law, dwindled, as many scholars argue that there has been an 
active “backlash against law” in the years that following the Sun Zhigang-incident (Minzner 
2013).  This leads towards the second point, namely the CCPs reaction after the incident. The 
reaction was aimed to reassert control over the discussions surrounding reforms following the 
incident. The discussion surrounding constitutional reforms became increasingly limited, and 
there was even a prosecution of editors of the Southern Metropolitan Daily who broke the 
news about Sun Zhigang’s death (Hand 2006: 184). However, this case illustrates the 
optimism around the development of a rule of law in China at the start of the 2000s.  
 
I should however mention that not everyone was optimistic about the development of the 
legal system in China during that time. However, Peerenboom (2002: 560) states that an 
optimistic view regarding the “two decades of reforms have produced remarkable changes 
with respect to institutions, laws, and practices”. This shows how different a view on the 
development of, for example, a rule of law can be depending on the time frame and 
perspective you adopt. Taking a snapshot on China’s development and you will become more 
of a pessimistic when it comes to the rule of law. Also, if you view China’s progress since the 
late 1970s the gains appear remarkable, but when considering how close China is to the rule 
of law enjoyed in developed nations the distance left to travel can look daunting.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 See for example Joseph Fewsmith (2003): “The Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession That Didn’t 
Happen” in China Quarterly no 173, 1-16 
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3.2.2.3 Recent development: A backlash against law? 
 
As I have previously mentioned, the development of a legal system in post-reform China, can 
be seen as quite remarkable. However, the most difficult reforms are those still to come and 
we can also ask questions about the quality of the legal reforms that have already been 
enacted, and especially towards it as an efficient conflict resolution mechanism. Qianfang 
Zhang (2006: 138) mentions that even though China had seen quantitative achievements in 
the development of the legal system, we could ask questions about their quality. In other 
words, even though China could advocate that laws are now in place for sustaining a growing 
country, we can often see that these laws are neither being followed or enforced. Furthermore, 
Qianfang Zhang (Ibid) argues that writing words on paper is quite an easy step in a hitherto 
lawless society. What is difficult, however, is to make them count in daily life, and this 
“fulfillment is the very touchstone for rule of law” (Ibid). Meaning, setting up a framework 
does not do much if they are not followed in practice. We can also argue that most of the 
reforms in the 90s and early 2000s were of the more limited technical type. Peerenboom notes 
that the legal institutions had reached an impasse and that without deeper reforms, the legal 
institutions would be too weak to actually be able to handle the responsibilities of facilitating 
economic development, social justice and a more harmonious society. This will inevitably 
lead to people seeking other ways to pursue their interests, including demonstrations 
(Peerenboom 2007: 229), and therefore would the legal-system lose its credibility. 
Consequently, we can see that the development in the 90s and the early 2000s had been 
incredible, but it still have problems in achieving Fullers basic criteria for a stable legal 
system. We can therefore argue that the rule of law was still early in the process, and that the 
reforms in the 90s and the early 2000s had not established an effective conflict resolution 
mechanism.  
 
Recently, there has been a noticeable shift in the enthusiasm of some academics towards the 
development of a rule of law in China. Many argue that the CCP is turning away from the 
legal reforms they started in 1978. As Jiang Ping, a legal scholar from China notes in a speech 
from 2010: “I think we are in a period where the rule of law is in retreat” (Clark 2010). If this 
is the case, it will have consequences for my hypotheses.  
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It is true that since 2003 the focus shifted there was an emphasis on the “harmonious society” 
and re-emphasize on courts loyalty to the party. This is very noticeable in, for example, Luo 
Gan’s speech from 2006, who served as the head of the Party’s Central Political-Legal 
Committee:  
“In his speech Luo appeared to be drawing a distinction between “rule of law” and 
“socialist rule of law” with the latter emphasizing the legal system’s obligation to 
follow Party leadership, and in particular Hu Jintao’s theory of harmonious society” 
(Liebman 2007: 628) 
The reason behind the change in focus was that the legal institutions were not able to handle 
the increasing responsibilities that they had to take care of (Minzner 2011: 947). Courts 
remained weak actors compare to local Party, government and commercial interests, while at 
the same time the courts had to take care of an increasing number of economic and social 
disputes as a result of the rapid economic growth13. As pointed out by Peerenboom and 
Qianfang Zhang, the legal reforms, though impressive, were unable to keep up with the 
rapidly changing Chinese society, and deeper institutional reforms were obviously needed. 
Also, as the Sun Zhigang-incident illustrates, there was an increase in the number of cases 
where public interest activists and lawyers launched increasingly well-organized legal 
challenges against local and central government policies (Minzner 2011: 948). These trends 
made the CCP to rethink their reform policies, and from 2003 onwards, the CCP started to 
emphasize other practices and policies, namely a reemphasized on mediation practices. These 
new policies are what Minzner characterize as a “backlash against law” in China. Minzner 
writes that the CCP are now trying to “neuter the very rule-of-law pressures that they 
themselves unleashed in the late twentieth century” (Minzner 2013: 69).  
 
Since the early 2000s, one of the biggest changes to Chinese society is that the CCP has 
somewhat moved away from court trials according to law as a way to resolve social 
grievances. This is a step away from the policies of the 1990s, where courts were heavily 
emphasized. Instead, there has been a resurrection of mediation practices14. In short, 
mediation is an effort from a third party resolve disputes by encouraging disputing parties to 
voluntarily reach an agreement. Minzner points out that these practices are influenced by the 
revolutionary era of the 1930s and 40s, and these practices emphasize a “fusion of mediation, 
                                                          
13  For a summary of these increasing responsibilities, see Peerenboom 2007: 226-227 
14 More on mediation in the legal system under Mao, see Jerome Cohen (1966) “Chinese Mediation on the Eve 
of Modernization” in California Law Review, Vol. 54, Issue 3 
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populism, and Party political work as a preferred means to resolve citizen grievances, instead 
of trial adjudication according to formal legal norms” (Minzner 2011: 944). Mediation in 
China is done in many different ways. One is done through People Mediation Committees, 
administrated by local villager and resident committees. These resemble the mediational 
practices of Maoist China, where mediation was aimed to educate and persuade parties to 
adopt the ideology and values promoted by the CCP (Halegua 2006: 1). The focus has 
changed in the reform-era, and now the focus in on “resolving disputes and thus ensuring 
social stability required for economic development” (Ibid).  
 
Mediation is also, more recently, performed within the judiciary system. Here, judges are the 
mediators, and they effectively resolve cases outside of the courtroom. In 2007, the Supreme 
Court of China issued an opinion where they instructed courts to increase training for judges 
in the use of mediation, establish systems of rewards that encourage judges to resort to 
mediation, and to include success in using mediation in the regular career assessments of 
judges.  
 
For Minzner, the strategy of using mediation creates a short-term stability for CCP, but he 
writes that it is rather worrying in the long-term since it is actually undermining the 
development of China’s legal norms and institutions. Minzner, and other that are critical of 
this development, does favor a court-centric approach to dispute resolution based on formal 
law. Consequently, moving away from adjudication is in itself a negative development in this 
perspective. However, for my thesis, emphasizing mediation over adjudication is not 
necessarily a bad development, if the mediation practices is a more effective conflict 
resolution mechanism than the emphasis on the courts of the 90s and 2000s.  
 
One of the critics of the mediation practices, and especially the judiciary mediation practices, 
is that it is seen in the context of achieving a harmonious society which have created an 
incredible pressure for Chinese judges to resolve social grievances. Some argue that the 
mediation processes and the focus on a harmonious society also creates an incentive for the 
judges to “persuaded the parties to accept solutions that actually benefited the judges 
themselves, for example, by reducing the rate of appeals” (Xin He 2009: 436). Consequently, 
according to Minzner (2011:959), the judges are essentially forcing settlements on parties. 
This goes against notion that mediation should be voluntary between the parties, as stipulated 
in the Civil Procedure Law of 1991 (Pissler 2013: 964). However, there is no agreement about 
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that this is actually happening in China. Pissler (2013: 971) writes that “recent studies contain 
anecdotal evidence about how judges are pressing parties to a settlement of the dispute in 
order to restore social harmony”. Peerenboom (2002: 288) writes that “it is up to debate”.  
 
If the law that the mediation should be voluntary is not followed, then this creates problem for 
China’s development of the rule of law as an effective conflict resolution mechanism. It is 
problematic for the criteria for the rule of law if the legal frameworks that are set up are not 
followed. It is difficult to actually check if pressuring in a mediation process is a common 
thing in the legal institutions in China. However, if people, in large part, are being forced into 
a decision they do not agree with, and they feel this decision was both unfair and unjust, we 
should expect a drop in people’s trust in the justice system in China. Using the World Values 
Survey, we find that the trust in the legal institutions in China has not changed that much after 
mediation and focus on a harmonious society was reemphasized (World Value Survey 2014).  
 
When conducting these surveys in non-democratic nations, it is natural to ask if the results 
are, in fact, skewed because of political fear. However, the research done by Qing Yang and 
Wenfang Tang (2010: 420-422) show that these results are valid after checking for political 
fear. They also find that trust in legal institutions is genuinely high in China, and what greatly 
shapes people trust is individual’s evaluations of the institutional performances (Ibid: 429). 
Consequently, we could argue that pressuring people to a settlement through mediation is not 
really a problem in China, as people appear to still trusting the legal institutions in China. This 
point towards that in most of the cases, the people are quite satisfied with the outcome of the 
resolutions done through the legal institutions in China. 
 
Another problem regarding the reemphasize on mediation is that there has been problems with 
the enforcement of the decisions made through mediation. This problem has been generally 
accepted as one of the main problems with mediation (Minzner 2011, Pissler 2013). This is 
specifically problematic in the development of a rule of law in China that fits with the criteria 
presented earlier in this paper. Mediation has been emphasized as one of the main conflict 
resolution mechanisms in the legal system of China. However, if decisions made through 
mediation are not properly enforced, the mechanisms are inherently weak. To create an 
efficient and trusty conflict resolution mechanism, enforcement is important. This is central to 
Fuller’s basic criteria of a stable legal system. In 2002, the Supreme People’s Court tried to 
clarify that the mediation agreement had the legal effect of a contract, which may not be 
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unilaterally modified or rescinded (Pissler 2013: 973). This was noted to be too ambiguous a 
statement, and legal observers questioned the binding effect of the mediation agreement. 
However, this problem is something CCP was aware of, and, in 2010, they issued a new 
People’s Mediation Law. In article 31, it states that “a mediation agreement reached upon 
mediation by a people’s mediation commission is binding to all parties concerned, and the 
parties concerned shall fulfil it as agreed” (translation from International Labour 
Organization). Pissler (2013: 993-994) writes that there is hope that the previous worries 
about enforcement have become irrelevant with the new law. There have also been several 
other measures taken to enforce settlements agreed upon through mediation in the courts and 
by People’s Mediation Committees (Pissler 2013: 974-978). Consequently, the CCP was 
aware of these challenges, and have taken action to improve the conflict resolution 
mechanisms in China with laws and some reforms. The legal framework has been both 
specified and clarified. 
 
To get a better impression of the realities regarding the change from adjudication to mediation 
as a conflict resolution mechanism in the Chinese legal system, we can compare the 
propaganda campaigns of the 1990s and that of 2010, which provide an official picture of the 
“Model Judge” that other judges should strive to emulate. In 1999, one of the judges honored 
was Judge Qin Lingmei. She was nicknamed as the stone-cold Judge, which referred to her 
reputation for cool-headedness, rationality, and adherence to neutrality (Minzner 2011: 954). 
Another example was Judge Gao Binghuan who was praised for her fearless efforts in 
executing court judgments. In one case, Gao actually triggered a riot. This just shows that the 
focus in the 1990s was for judges who were “exalted for adhering to a somewhat autonomous 
concept of law. They were depicted as enforcing legal norms in civil disputes, even at the cost 
of social discontent, and in criminal (or administrative) disputes, even at the cost of conflict 
with core local Party leaders“ (Minzner 2011: 955).  
 
In 2010, Judge Chen Yanping was highlighted as the model judge. The reasons for this were 
that she handled “over 3100 cases in 14 years without a single complaint or appeal; without a 
single petition by a disgruntled party; without one wrongly decided case” (Ibid: 950). It is 
clear by looking at this that the CCP’s view on the legal system has changed and that there is 
now more focus on efficiency and achieving a harmonious society.  
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The change between ideal judges is striking. When interviewed in 2011, Judge Qin Lingmei, 
the praised judge in 1999, shared her experience of the change of focus and of her new job as 
a mediator:  
"When I was a judge a few years ago, I was once criticized online for my judgment in 
a bank loan case. The post is still online. In fact, it was written by another judge ... I 
just smiled at such misunderstandings. I didn't find it necessary to explain myself. I 
was confident that I knew my profession. But for my new job, there are no written 
rules specified for me to follow. And whether I've done a good job is up to those 
people involved," she said. "Honestly speaking, it troubles me." (Interview in Global 
Times 15.02.2011). 
 
Comparing the Propaganda Campaigns tells us a tendency with the switch to mediation. The 
interview with former praised Judge Qin tells us the reality of the judges in a mediation-
process, as they are not really guided by any written rules, but rather they have to trust their 
own instinct: "Since there are no written standards, I can't tell whether I've done a good job. 
It's not like before, when I could assess my performance by looking at how many of my cases 
were successfully appealed” (Interview in Global Times 15.02.2011). Liebman notes (2008: 
37) that this is problematic, emphasizing that the “courts are under pressure to resolve 
disputes that come before them in ways that prevent claims from escalating but often lack 
clear guidance as to how to do so”. The lack of clear guidance is a problem, and going back to 
our criteria for a good conflict resolution mechanism, this goes against the necessary 
consistency and clarity of the legal system. The roles of the mediator and of the institution 
need to be clear, and China needs to address the problem of vagueness in the legal system. 
This issue has, however, been addressed. Before the People’s Mediation Law of 2010, the 
duty of the mediator was quite vague. However, this has been clarified by the law of 2010 
(Pissler 2013: 988), but the efficacy of this law has been difficult to assess as of yet. However, 
this is a necessary step in achieving some of the criteria for establishing an effective conflict 
resolution mechanism, as presented earlier in this paper.  
 
Regardless of the problems, mediation is considered to be a very successful conflict resolution 
mechanism in China (Pissler 2013: 992). Statistics show that between 2003 and 2007, the 
People’s Mediation Committees mediated 16 million disputes. They successfully resolved 95 
% of all cases (Ibid). 
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What is also important here is that the courts remain an important element of the legal system 
in China and an important conflict resolution mechanism. From 1999 to 2009, civil disputes 
that has been settled by courts in China has steadily raised. In 2002, there were 4,420,123 
cases accepted by the courts in China. In 2009, the number of accepted cases was 5,800,144 
(Pissler 2013: 999). The number of disputes settled through mediation decreased throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s, before increasing rapidly from 2004 to 2009, where disputes 
settled through mediation increased from 4,414,233 in 2004 to 5,797,300 in 2009 (Ibid: 995-
996). This means that the court as a conflict resolution mechanism has not been marginalized 
by the recent development towards mediation.  
 
Therefore, in this thesis, the recent emphasis of mediation as a conflict resolution mechanism 
cannot be viewed as a bad development. In the 2000s, the CCP acknowledge that there was, in 
fact, a problem with their conflict resolution mechanism, as they could not handle the 
mounting social grievances in the Chinese society. The re-emphasizing of mediation can 
consequently be seen as a supplementation to adjudication in China, one that has not 
marginalized the courts, as the courts do still serve an extremely important role as a conflict 
resolution mechanism in China. Consequently, the change from adjudication to mediation can 
be seen as a “moderate policy adjustment in response to changing social circumstances” 
(Chen 2012: 16).  
 
However, it is not without its problems. Enforcing the decisions through mediation has been 
difficult, and as of as late as 2010, was still specified and made clearer with the People’s 
Mediation Law. There is also a problem with the lack of a clear guideline and framework for 
mediators and others within the legal system itself, which the statement from the previous 
model judge illustrates. However, this is also something the CCP is aware of, and is moving 
to address. However, it is too early to see if the steps that have been made to address these 
issues in the legal system in China have solved the problems of enforcement and vagueness.   
 
3.2.3 An effective conflict resolution mechanism? 
 
As seen in this chapter, the attitude scholars and analysts have towards the development of the 
rule of law in China depends on what glasses you put on. There are almost as many 
definitions of the rule of law as there are legal theorists, and this also explains the big 
difference in the quantitative data about the development of a rule of law. Having a thick 
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definition of the rule of law, for example the liberal democratic definition, while examining 
China, will lead to a very negative view on the development of a rule of law in China. In this 
thesis, I have taken a thin and very basic definition of the rule of law, and have found that the 
development of the rule of law in China has been quite remarkable, following the reforms of 
the 1970s. However, in the early 2000s, China was still some way off achieving a thin rule of 
law. 
Around 2003, the CCP changed both its policy and focus when it came to the development of 
its legal institutions, as mediation practices were re-emphasized as a conflict resolution 
mechanism. The focus was that the civil disputes should be more settled through mediation, 
as the courts could not cope with the increase in disputes in a changing Chinese society.  
 As seen here, the court-centric view will have a negative perspective on this recent 
development, as the importance of the courts have not been nearly as emphasized in the recent 
developments as they were previously in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, in the context 
of this thesis, I see these developments as more positive. The CCP identified the problems 
within the legal system causing it to be an ineffective conflict resolution mechanism, and 
consequently made several policy changes aimed to directly solve those problem. It is also 
important to note that the CCP directed their focus on mediation practices in order to 
supplement the more traditional court system, rather than to replace it. As seen, the number of 
disputes settled in court continues to rise in China, and therefore, mediation has not 
marginalized the courts in China.  
However, there remain challenges in the development of an effective conflict resolution 
mechanism in China. The current mechanism for handling conflicts must be further 
strengthened. Most importantly, a clear framework, from which both the court system, as well 
as the mediation practices, can follow and work from, must be properly set up. It is also 
important to make sure that this framework translates to practice. This is important, because it 
allows citizens to plan their life accordingly and allows disputes to be resolved consistently. 
This is essential in achieving an efficient and clear conflict resolution mechanism in China. 
This framework needs to be in place if the legal institutions should act as a conflict resolution 
mechanism in a democratization process.  
Consequently, China is still on the long march towards a thin version of a rule of law, and are 
some off establishing it as an effective resolution mechanism.  
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3.3 Nationalism 
 
My hypothesis is that aggressive nationalism in China can be one of the forces that can push 
China towards a warpath in a democratization process. Therefore, it is important to identify if 
nationalism in China has any aggressive traits. When the nationalist card is played by elites, 
how likely is it that the elites can link this to expansionism and aggression, and can 
nationalism in China take on a life on its own and pressure political leaders towards an 
expansionist and aggressive policy?  
To answer these question I will go back to the 1980s, and go through the change of historical 
narrative and the Patriotic Education Campaign. The content of the Patriotic Education 
Campaign is of particular relevance to this thesis and the testing of my hypotheses, as I argue 
that the Patriotic Education Campaign and the change towards the victimization-view of 
Chinese nationalism has had consequences for the way Chinese nationalism actually are 
today. I also identify that these are not a creation of the CCP in the face of ideological 
bankruptcy after 1989, but rather a supplement to the nationalistic ideals already present in 
Chinese society. 
I will then turn to popular nationalism and explore the dynamic between popular nationalism 
and the CCP. Here, I will discuss the source of popular nationalism, and the dynamic between 
popular nationalism and the more state-led nationalism, including the actions taken by the 
CCP when faced with nationalistic demonstrations. Here, we can see that popular nationalism 
in China has grown quite substantially in recent years, and that it is now a force that is 
influencing the CCP’s foreign policy (Gries 2004: 134).  
A significant part of this chapter will be dedicated to the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 
2012.  I focus on the 2012 demonstration as they are the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations 
in China since the normalization of the bilateral relationship between Japan and China in 
1972(Wallace and Weiss 2014: 1), and, they are also the most recent. The 2012 
demonstrations show us numerous things about Chinese nationalism. The demonstrations in 
2012 were mostly nationalistic in nature. Nationalistic demonstrations in China can be 
overestimated as people often use these demonstrations as an opportunity to demonstrate 
against other things, either camouflaged under the banner of nationalism, or just openly, 
regarding domestic issues. While there was an element of this also in the demonstrations in 
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2012, looking at the slogans used during the demonstrations, this was just a small minority. 
The overwhelming majority had slogans that were nationalistic in nature.  
The 2012 demonstrations demonstrates that nationalistic demonstrations in China can spiral 
out of control, and that the CCP have to take action to prevent this from happening. These 
demonstrations, as well as those of previous years, show us that Chinese nationalism has 
taken on a life of its own.  
Finally, the 2012 demonstrations does show us the element of aggressive nationalism in China 
that fit well with the definition of aggressive nationalism presented earlier in this thesis. Japan 
is constantly looked through the historical lens, and nationalist in China are often pushing the 
CCP to take a stronger stance towards Japan. 
The section concludes that nationalism in China is an extremely attractive idea in China, but it 
is also very dangerous in a democratization process. Nationalism is therefore extremely 
attractive for the threatened elites in China, but also a source of war. 
 
3.3.1 The nature of Chinese nationalism 
 
Nationalism has become a driving force in the political life and economic modernization of 
China. Because of this, Chinese nationalism has also become one of the most popular research 
topics since the 1990s. The most recent arguments about nationalism in China have focused 
on the debate if Chinese nationalism is a top-down creation or a bottom-up phenomenon. The 
top-down perspective focuses on the legitimacy crisis that the regime found themselves in 
after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Zhao writes that the “Tiananmen Incident” could be 
seen as “a result of the bankruptcy of the official ideology”. In order to save themselves from 
this legitimacy crisis following the Tiananmen Square Incident, the leaders of the CCP “began 
to wrap themselves in the banner of nationalism” (Zhao 1998: 289).  The launch of the 
Patriotic Education Campaign in the 1990s, which will be discussed in detail later in this 
section, was the survival strategy adopted by the CCP to boost their legitimacy. The top-down 
perspective argues that because of this campaign, and the political maneuvers adopted by the 
CCP to wrap themselves in the banner of nationalism, Chinese nationalism in the 1990s was 
“constructed and enacted from the top by the Communist State” (Zhao 1998: 287).  This top-
down perspective is also shared by Thomas Christensen who expressed in an influential 
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Foreign Affairs article that “since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it 
must be even more Chinese” (Christensen 1996). 
Consequently, according to this top-down perspective, the CCP has based its legitimacy on 
nationalism, and the top-down interpretation is that the CCP has constructed Chinese 
nationalism as a tool to legitimize its rule.  
The bottom-up perspective sees it differently. Xu Wu (2007: 125) argues that “it was Chinese 
nationalism that constructed and enacted the CCP’s new policy and strategy, not the other 
way around”. Here, the CCP, after 1989, was only trying to catch up with the tide and to 
redefine its political identity (Ibid). Gries (2004) also have a bottom-up perspective and writes 
that the top-down perspective of Chinese nationalism is incomplete. He writes that “Chinese, 
like all peoples, have deep-seated emotional attachments to their national identity” (Gries 
2004: 19). One example of a bottom-up nationalism in China for Gries, is the Belgrade 
Bombing Protest in 1999 were Chinese abroad did go out in the streets to protest (Ibid: 128). 
Nationalism is not a top-down phenomenon in China and the CCP are actually struggling to 
keep up with popular nationalist demands. The party is slowly losing its hegemony over 
Chinese nationalism (Ibid: 121).  
There is also a middle ground. Weiss (2014: 220) writes that “popular nationalism is partially 
the product of state-led patriotic propaganda, but it is also deeply rooted in society”. He Yinan 
argues that elite mythmaking is central to explaining the rise of Chinese nationalism. She 
argues that with the Propaganda Campaign, the CCP created anti-Japanese myths in Chinese 
society. However, once the CCP unleashed popular Chinese nationalism, this then took on a 
life of its own and made it difficult for the CCP to control the myths they had created (Yinan 
He 2007a: 9).   
Most authors agree that present day nationalism is a complex mixture of both state and 
popular nationalism, where mechanisms of both top-down and bottom-up mobilization are 
closely interrelated. Nationalism was present in pre-reform China, and dating back to dynastic 
times. One could even argue that the communist revolution of 1949 was more of a 
nationalistic revolution than a truly communist one (Xu Wu 2007: 123).  
 
Faced with the legitimacy crisis in post-reform China, the CCP has gradually based its 
legitimacy on other aspects than Marxism. According to Bruce Gilley, there are six main 
sources of legitimacy in post-Tiananmen Square China: “(a) economic growth and 
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development, (b) stability and governance, (c) political and civil rights,(d) international 
prestige and nationalism, (e) cultural or historical dispositions to trust the national state, and 
(f) social, cultural, and economic rights” (2008: 271). There is disagreement regarding the 
most important source of legitimacy in China today. However, there is agreement that 
nationalism is one of the main sources of legitimacy. 
 
The CCP turned to nationalism because nationalism was an attractive idea. Not just because it 
solved a lot of the problems for CCP. Nationalism was an idea that was present in Chinese 
society, as it is in essentially all societies, before the CCP adopted it as policy. There was 
therefore a demand for nationalistic ideas in China, and the CCP could therefore be one 
supplier of these ideas. The fact that these ideas were present in society before the campaign 
contributed to the success of the Patriotic Education Campaign, which I will focus on later in 
the chapter. In other words, the underlying nationalistic sentiment and the state-led Patriotic 
Education Campaign were mutually enforcing. As Zhao writes, the CCP discovered that 
nationalism remained the one bedrock of political beliefs that most Chinese shared (Zhao 
2004:213). This made the Patriotic Education Reform far more successful than previous 
campaigns. 
The change in both policy and focus of the CCP was therefore not the sole reason for a rise in 
nationalism in modern day China. However, there is no doubt that the CCP’s policy in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident profoundly influenced young people’s attitudes 
and perceptions towards the outside world and towards themselves. Not only did it shape 
people’s taste towards nationalism in some degree with the Patriotic Education Campaign, it 
has also one other significant effect, namely that the CCPs focus on patriotism as one of their 
ideological legitimacy did signal to others that this was now an accepted idea in the 
marketplace of ideas. Before the reforms, Marxism had complete supremacy in the 
marketplace of ideas. The signal of change, however, opened up the market for other actors to 
take advantage of this. As Magnus Rom Jensen (2011: 84) writes: “producers had been given 
both a growing audience as well as a wink and a nod from the CCP that nationalism would in 
most cases not be censored”.  
There is agreement that the state-led policy of the Patriotic Education Campaign greatly 
contributed to the rise of popular nationalism in China during the 1990s (Gries 2004: 
74).Therefore, as Zheng Wang (2008: 801) writes, understanding the Patriotic Education 
Campaign is a precondition to understanding the rapid change from the democratic movement 
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of the 1980s, to the more external-oriented nationalism that we see today. The Patriotic 
Education Campaign and the change of narrative in the 1980s is therefore what I will 
concentrate on in the next chapter. 
3.3.1.1 The Patriotic Education Reform and the 
Victimization-narrative 
 
One important factor in understanding nationalism in post-reform China is the change to the 
historical narrative. The change is characterized by a move from the view that China was the 
victor in the “War of Resistance” against Japan to a greater emphasis on the victimization 
(Gries 2004: 79). The focus on national humiliation and the victimization narrative is, 
however, not a new development in China. It is a recurring theme in both the pre-1949 
Republican writings and the post-1949 Taiwanese discourse. Cohen (2003: 149-151) writes 
that the issue around national humiliation in China first began to emerge in public discourse 
during the Qing Dynasty. This discourse focuses on the “century of humiliation”, which 
begins with China’s defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition of Hong Kong 
in 1842. It was a period marked by major wars between China and Western powers as well as 
Japan (Gries 2004: 46-47). Therefore, from the outset, with this narrative Chinese nationalism 
was strongly associated with both anti-Western and anti-Japanese sentiments.   
The Century of humiliation ended in 1949 when it is said that Mao declared that “Ours will no 
longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. The Chinese people have stood up!” With 
the end of the Civil War, the narrative changed and the national humiliation and the 
victimization narrative were not used that much by the CCP. There was a focus on the “victor 
narrative” that, under the leadership of the CCP, the Chinese people overcame the difficulties 
and won national independence. The storyline under the communist was simple; without the 
Party-led defeat of the Japanese, a “New China” would have been impossible. Consequently, 
there was a greater focus on the praising of the victorious leadership of Mao and the 
Communist party, and the history of Japanese aggression was given little attention. Gries 
notes that “the newly established People’s Republic did not wish to dwell on Chinese 
suffering” (Gries 2004: 73). 
In explaining the past, there was a greater emphasis on class struggle as an explanation for the 
Chinese revolution, foreign imperialism and the Chinese civil war. This made the Chinese 
decline and suffering in modern history a product of internal corruption and incompetence of 
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the feudal or capitalist rulers, the Qing court and the Kuomintang15. Foreign invasions 
therefore became a secondary factor for the explanation of China’s traumatic history. This is 
best exemplified in the Japanese-Chinese relations prior to the economic reforms in 1978. As 
we know, and as we will see, the historic issues between Japan and China remain a sore spot, 
even today. However, before the 1980s, China did not aim any criticism towards the dominant 
Japanese view of the war. The dominant view in Japan at the time was a war narrative that 
blamed a small group of militarists for “hijacking the state and duping the Japanese nation 
into a disastrous war (Yinan He 2007a: 5). This “myth of military clique” whitewashed many 
of the wartime political actors, including the emperor, as well as many of the politicians and 
high-ranking bureaucrats that held prestige and power in Japanese politics after the war ended 
(Ibid). Also, this narrative ignored the enthusiasm and support that ordinary Japanese citizens 
actually gave the war policy (Ibid).   
 
This view was shared by many in Mao’s China. Not only was this because they wanted to 
create a more favorable view of Japan, as they were keen to normalize the relationship, but 
this distinction between a few bad Japanese and many good ones fit well into the class-based 
ideology from which the CCP’s legitimacy stemmed from. There was a greater acceptance of 
Japan and the “historical Japanese amnesia did not spark any Chinese protests in the 1970s” 
(Yinan He 2007a: 5). Before the 1980s, the youth did not have much knowledge regarding the 
Japanese atrocities during the war, as history textbooks rarely mentioned them, and as 
Callahan (2006: 186) found in his research, during the period of 1947 to 1990, no books about 
national humiliation were published in China. However, stories about “Japanese devils” were 
present in pre-reform China, but they were mostly passed on in communities and families 
(Yinan He 2007a: 6). These stories, however, did not expand from this in the Mao-period. 
One of the main reasons for this was that the CCP suppressed historical investigations into 
Japanese war crimes (Yinan He 2007b: 50). Therefore, there was neither official nor popular 
pressure in China to incite historical disputes with Japan (Ibid).  
In the early 1980s, the historical narrative changed. The turning point with the historical 
narrative was mainly caused by the Cultural Revolution during the period from 1966 to 1976. 
Mao’s fanaticism and extremism led to purging, persecution, injustice and, basically, social 
                                                          
15 Also sometimes spelled Guomindang.  The Kuomintang is the nationalist party that was formed by Sun Yat-
sen shortly after the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 1911. For more on the Kuomintang, see for example 
Kenneth Lieberthal (2004): Governing China: From Revolution to Reform, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 
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chaos and economic catastrophe (Zhao 2004: 210). It alienated people from the utopian 
communism that Mao had tried to instill earlier, and the Cultural Revolution resulted in a 
“widespread demise of communist ideology” (Ibid). The result was therefore that in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, the CCP was faced with an identity crisis called “the three belief crisis”: Crisis 
of faith in socialism, a crisis of belief in Marxism, and a crisis of trust in the party (Zhao 
2004: 211). The credibility of the Communist ideology was seriously diminished and the CCP 
could no longer enlist mass support for a socialist vision of the future16. There is evidence that 
the Communist rulers were afraid that ordinary Chinese citizens believed the CCP had lost 
their “mandate of heaven” (Wang 2008: 788).  
The CCP now needed a new framework of ideas in facilitating intra-party consolidation and 
for rallying public support. Gradually, patriotism, or state-nationalism, ”replaced” 
communism to become one of the ideological foundation of the CCP’s regime legitimacy. 
There was therefore no longer a need to see China’s history and the adoption of class struggle 
theories as explanations for the Chinese revolution, foreign imperialism, and the Chinese 
Civil War. In the previous narrative, foreign invasions were a secondary explanation, but with 
the change towards patriotism as the ideological foundation, this became the main 
explanation. China was being seen as a raped woman again, a view that was present in the 
1930s (Gries 2004: 79).  
The change in the narrative during the beginning of the 1980s is evident in two events: first, 
the Japanese textbook controversy of 1982; and, second, the building of new museums in 
China. The textbook controversy is evidence of this change of focus in the narrative, because 
China had not previously focused on challenging the Japanese view of history. However, 
during this incident, Beijing engaged in an acrimonious strife with Tokyo over the narrative 
and commemoration of war history (Yinan He 2007b: 51). It was a response to the discussion 
between progressive and conservative views of history in Japan, and the Japanese and 
international media reported on the revisions to Japan’s textbooks. This was picked up by the 
Chinese media, and a “full-scale campaign ensued, recapitulating the story of Japanese 
aggression and atrocities in vivid detail” (Allen Whiting 1989, cited in Lind 2008: 161)17. The 
                                                          
16 Please note that I do not argue that Marxism died in the 70s and the 80s as a source of legitimatization in 
China. However, it had less appeal in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution than it previously had under 
Mao, and this seriously hurt the CCPs legitimacy. In China today, we can maybe see a revival of Marxism and 
Maoism as it has gained some popularity again. For more on the possible revival see for example Willy Lam 
(2012): ”The Maoist Revival and the Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics”  China Perspectives [Online], 2012/2  
17 It is interesting to see that it was the Chinese media who picked it up first, as the early 1980s was the 
beginning of the commercialization of the Chinese media (Shirk 2011: 8-9).  The media’s role in the spread of 
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motive behind this change was the aforementioned identity crisis inside the party, which also 
contributed to a noticeable split inside the party itself, and the growing socioeconomic 
dislocation that the economic reforms had brought about, and which inevitably escalated the 
“Democratic Wall” campaign (Yinan He 2007b: 54-55). Deng saw the textbook incident as an 
excellent opportunity to show “his determination to fend off inimical foreign influence, as 
well as a check the pro-West wing of the reformist faction” (Ibid).  This was a dramatic 
departure from the earlier policy, as it showed that China was no longer accepting of the 
historical narrative of Maoist China, and the victimization narrative of pre-revolution China 
was returning. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, China built new museums, which was a more way of 
institutionalizing the victimization narrative from the CCP. In 1987, the “Museum of the War 
of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression” opened in Beijing, a stone’s 
throw away from the Marco Polo Bridge, the site of the first skirmish of the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1937. The museum tells the story of a united Chinese people, with the CCP as the 
leading force, engaging in a heroic struggle. There are rooms that detail Japanese atrocities – 
900 cities bombed, civilians murdered, slave labor, and biological and chemical warfare 
(Sneider 2013: 42).  
In 1985, the “Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders,” 
opened its doors. In his thesis, Magnus Rom Jensen (2011: 52) writes that he could not fail to 
see the similarities between this museum and the concentration camps in Europe he visited 
during a school trip. This is not a coincidence. Museum director Zhu Cheng Shan stated that 
with the renovation in 2007, they were very much influenced by the Holocaust Museum in 
Washington, DC, and similar memorials such as Yad Veshem in Jerusalem and Auschwitz in 
Poland, and were actively trying to emulate these museums and memorials, in both their 
design and content (Sneider 2013: 43).  
The building of these museums is significant. Jennifer Lind (2008: 15) writes, that “by 
deciding to erect a monument, build a museum, or commemorate a national holiday in honor 
of a person or event, a government confers recognition and honor”. Building monuments and 
                                                          
nationalistic ideas and controversies towards Japan will be the focus of the next chapter. The focus will be 
mainly on the media’s role in the most recent island disputes with Japan. But, it is interesting to note that the 
media could have played a pivotal role as early as 1982, and the cuts in government subsidies and the drive to 
enter the market to earn revenue could have been a reason for the strong reaction in 1982 from the media, as 
well as Chinas reaction as a whole. 
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museums is therefore an important part of how a nation remembers its past, and they are 
“important indicators of prevailing political opinion and national priorities” (Ibid). Therefore, 
it was clear that the CCP wanted to focus on the historical narrative, and the atrocities endured 
by the Chinese people at the hands of the Japanese during the Second World War.  
The shifting of narrative and the focus on patriotism as one of the party’s main sources of 
legitimacy were not overly successful in calming critics of the reforms of the 1980s, or the 
“democracy wall” campaign, and the problems escalated towards the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in 1989. Tiananmen Square was the culmination of many problems and processes 
that arose from the economic reforms and the Cultural Revolution. The CCP learned a number 
of important lessons from the Tiananmen Square massacre. First, the CCP’s identity crisis 
needed to be resolved before the CCP imploded. The CCP needed to establish its legitimacy 
on different aspects than just economic performance and its diminishing Communist ideology. 
This was something that had been of concern to the CCP since the start of the reforms. As 
previously noted, the CCP had begun the process of “replacing” communism with patriotism 
before 1989 through the change in the historical narrative and the building of museums, but 
Tiananmen Square and the fall of the Soviet Union made the urgency of this issue more 
immediate. Another lesson of Tiananmen Square for the CCP was that it needed to politically 
indoctrinate China’s youth, one of the best-represented demographics among the protestors in 
the spring of 1989 (Suisheng Zhao 1998: 289).  
The solution was to place further emphasis on patriotic education. As Deng Xiaoping stated in 
June of 1989:  
“I have told foreign guests that during the last 10 years our biggest mistake was made 
in the field of education, primary on the ideological and political education – not just 
of students but of the people in general. We did not tell them enough about the need 
for hard struggle, about what China was like in the old days and what kind of country 
it was to become. That was a serious error on our part” (People’s Daily 1989) 
The Patriotic Education Reform was therefore aimed at resolving the issues that of the 1980s. 
In 1991 Jiang Zemin, then leader of the CCP, published a letter in the People’s Daily stating 
that China should conduct education on Chinese modern and contemporary history and 
national conditions to students from the university-level down to the kindergarten-level.  Jiang 
Zemin further explained that the education should go from easy to difficult and it should be 
persistent (Wang 2008: 789). 
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The Patriotic Education Campaign officially started in 1991, when the CCP issued a 
document called “ The General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and 
Contemporary History and National Conditions” (Wang 2008:790).  The General Outline said 
that it was required for all schools to implement the requirements in a period of three years. 
The document also stated that the reform was China’s fundamental strategy to “defend against 
the ‘peaceful evolution’ plot of international hostile powers and is the most important mission 
of all schools” (Wang 2008: 790).  
Even though the campaign officially started in 1991, it was not implemented on a large scale 
until 1994 when the CCP’s Central Committee issued the “Outline of Implementing Patriotic 
Education”. This outline laid out the objective of conducting education on patriotism “to 
boost the nation’s spirit, enhance its cohesion, foster its self-esteem and sense of pride, 
consolidate and develop a patriotic united front to the broadest extent, and direct and rally the 
masses’ patriotic passion to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” (Zhao 1998: 293). The education was for everyone, but as the lesson learned 
from Tiananmen it was particularly aimed at youth, and patriotic education was incorporated 
into the teaching at every level of education, from kindergarten to universities (Ibid). It was a 
massive campaign and Zhao (1998:292) argues that 95 % of Beijing primary and secondary 
school students were affected by it, for example through required viewing of movies that were 
recommended by the State Education Commission.  
The content of the patriotic education was vast and wide-ranging. However, there were two 
themes that particularly dominated namely Chinese tradition and history, and national unity 
and territorial integrity (Zhao 1998: 296). In the historical education there was a special 
emphasis on China’s national development process, characterized by the idea of the country’s 
struggle against foreign aggression and its constant effort to improve itself. It was essentially 
designed to present Chinese youth with detailed information about China’s traumatic and 
humiliating experience in the face of Western and Japanese invasion. The Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945) was particularly highlighted and was treated as “the most important military and 
political conflict in Chinese history” (Yinan He 2007b: 57). In effect, the “vicious Japanese 
imperialist aggressors” replaced the Kuomintang as the worst villains in the Chinese historical 
narrative (Ibid)18.  
                                                          
18 Consequently, the view of one of Mao’s bitter rivals, Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang between 
1928 and 1975, has been rehabilitated in recent years. When I visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, 
there were three main persons you could buy pictures of. These were Mao, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. 
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As previously noted, the textbook under Mao’s rule focused very little on the Japanese war 
crimes. Prior to the textbook revisions resulting from the Patriotic Education Reform, the 
most used textbook contained only two paragraphs on the Nanjing Massacre and one picture 
of bodies being buried by Japanese soldiers (Sneider 2013: 47).  This changed dramatically 
after the Patriotic Education Reform and the coverage of Japanese war crimes was extensively 
portrayed in the textbooks, often with “figures of fatalities, gruesome pictures, and even 
names of villages and individuals that had fallen victim to the aggression” (Yinan He 2007b: 
58). In one of the newly revised textbooks from 2004, the subject of the Nanjing Massacre 
ends with this question: 
“Japanese rightwing forces vigorously deny that the Japanese military committed the 
Nanjing Massacre – the ultimate act of human cruelty – during its invasion of China. 
They consider it a type of wartime behavior. What do you think of this issue?” 
(Sneider 2013: 48) 
Modern history textbooks in China  therefore tell that, at the hands of foreign invaders and 
corrupt Chinese regimes, sovereignty was lost, territory dismembered, and the Chinese people 
were thus humiliated. In “National Humiliation, hatred and the soul of China”, a textbook 
published in 2001, the Century of Humiliation was summarized as follows: “in modern 
Chinese history since the Opium War, foreign powers have launched invasion after invasion, 
act after bloody act of coercive pillage, occupying Chinese sovereign territory, slaughtering 
the Chinese masses, looting China’s wealth, and stealing China’s cultural artifacts. All this 
stained China with blood and tears” (Cited in Callahan 2009: 38).  
The importance of school textbooks should not be understated. Mehlinger (1985: 287) argues 
that school textbooks represent the modern equivalent of village storytellers because they are 
responsible for conveying to youth what adults believe they should know about their own 
culture, as well as that of other societies. History textbooks are therefore major components in 
the construction and reproduction of national narratives.  
The youth in China are therefore educated in a history in which foreign powers did not simply 
attack China, but “actually enjoyed slaughtering, raping, torching, and looting China” 
(Callahan 2009: 41). As Callahan notes, “the history textbooks thus instruct China’s youth on 
how to distinguish the positive inside from the negative outside, domestic patriots from evil 
                                                          
Previously, only the CCP had been said to be the main force against Japan during the Second World War. 
However, now Chiang and the Kuomintang are being lauded for their role in defeating the Japanese in 
mainland China.  
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foreign invaders, and thus civilized Chinese from barbaric Europeans, Japanese, and 
Americans” (Callahan 2009: 42). In effect, the post-Patriotic-Education-Campaign generation 
has gone through school with a heavy focus on the suffering China experienced that was 
inflicted by Japan, and also by the West. As seen earlier, the history textbooks have a clear 
anti-Japanese and anti-Western focus when it comes to the century of humiliation. Therefore, 
the impression is often conveyed, as one Chinese observed, that “the education at school 
always instills the idea that Japanese are evil people and if you turn on the television most of 
the programs are about the anti-Japanese war” (Financial Times 23.12.2012). 
The effect of the Patriotic Education Campaign is very difficult to estimate, since the politics 
of collective memory in general have been observed to be difficult to measure (Markovits and 
Reich 1997: 9). However, Zhao (1998: 288) writes that “the dependence on patriotism to 
build support for the government and the patriotic education campaign by the Communist 
propagandists were directly responsible for the nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese people 
in the mid-1990s”. Others also argue that the Patriotic Education Campaign greatly 
contributed to the rise of nationalism in China during the 1990s (Gries 2004, Pyle 2007).  
With the change in historical narrative and with the Patriotic Education Campaign in place, 
the effects began to show themselves in the 90s, when popular nationalism really became a 
force in Chinese politics and society.  
3.3.1.2 The rise of Chinese popular nationalism 
 
Popular nationalism began to grow dramatically in China in the 1990s (Zhao 2013: 539). A 
multi-country and region survey conducted in 2008 by Wanfang Tang and Benjamin Darr 
(2012: 816) showed that China had one of the highest levels of popular nationalism in the 
world.  Xu Wu (2007: 127) writes that popular nationalism can be divided into two 
categories: grassroots nationalism and elite nationalism. In short, the differences between the 
two are that grassroots nationalism is the nationalistic feeling and activities by the general 
public in China. Demonstrations and other activities are examples of this. Elite nationalism 
refers to the rhetoric and thoughts of Chinese intellectual elites. The examples here are the 
publishing of books, for example the China Can Say No, which will be discussed later. Due to 
length restrictions, I will not discuss the differences between the two types of popular 
nationalism. This is also because the gap between grassroots nationalism and elite nationalism 
has gradually diminished since the advent of the Internet (Xu Wu 2007: 129).  
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The rise in populist nationalism in China became very evident with the popularity of China 
Can Say No, a book that was penned and edited by a group of Chinese intellectuals in 1996 
and quickly became a best seller in China. The book’s mainly anti-Western tone was aimed at 
the U.S: and the authors claimed themselves to be “New Boxers”19 (Xu Wu 2007: 27). There 
was a clear message, and that was to be “building up a strong military to reunify Taiwan with 
the mainland and to fight with U.S. if necessary; and standing up firmly against American 
hegemony and Japanese aggression” (Ibid). This book became an instant bestseller; Xu Wu 
(2007: 27) claims that it sold more than 100, 000 copies in the first month following its 
publication. The fact that it sold so well can be seen as evidence of the rise of popular 
nationalism in China in the 90s for the simple reason that the CCP did not force the people to 
buy it. Actually, Wu (2007: 27) and Zhao (2004: 242) claim that the CCP banned the book 
after initially praising it for fully reflecting popular opinion. Zhao (2004: 242) argues that the 
book was banned because the CCP was fearful of international reactions. As Gries (1997: 
182) notes, “the book struck a chord with its audience”; this is evident in the other writings 
that popped up in its aftermath. The success of China Can Say No, and the potential market 
suggested by its popularity, prompted copycats to jump on the wagon. A series of books with 
titles like Why China Can Say No, China Still Can Say No, and China Always Says No 
appeared on the market. All these books represented the xenophobic views expressed in 
China Can Say No and all were very anti-Western and anti-Japanese. In the book China Can 
Still Say No, the following statement was written about the Japanese: “Theirs is a different 
kind of blood ... We have probably made a mistake... you can only be humane towards 
humans; towards beasts you can only be bestial” (Gries 1997: 183). 
 
The populist nationalist discourse had also taken its own turn after 1989, and it was not 
always propagating the message that the CCP wishes to spread; as Gries (2004: 119) writes: 
“popular nationalists both support and challenge the state’s claims to legitimacy – and issue 
their own rival nationalistic claims”. 
We therefore have to understand popular nationalism in China as a phenomenon that partly 
spurns from the state-led nationalism, but has also developed into something new and 
independent, challenging the CCP. Consequently, because of popular nationalism’s challenge 
to the CCP, it is common to refer to nationalism in China as shuang ren jian – a double-edged 
sword (Weiss 2014: 36). Nationalism is a source of legitimacy for the CCP, but it is also a 
                                                          
19 This is a reference to the Boxer Rebellion, an anti-imperialist movement in China from 1899 to 1901.  
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source to judge the performance of the state. Nationalism has the capacity to undermine the 
government’s legitimacy if nationalists see the Chinese leadership as weak against foreign 
insults and provocation, but it also has the ability to strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy if the 
nationalists see ”the government staunchly defending the nation’s interests” (Weiss 2014: 
219). 
Most scholars of Chinese nationalism agree that popular nationalism and state-led nationalism 
are different but also interconnected. There is no agreement on whether popular nationalism is 
actually strong enough to challenge state-led nationalism and divert the course of Chinese 
foreign policy (Yinan He 2007a: 2). However, Yinan He suggests that if we are looking at the 
frequency of anti-Japanese demonstrations, the Chinese nationalism of the past decade “has 
become even more powerful than at any time in the history of the People’s Republic” (Ibid: 
54). What we can currently observe is that the CCP is actually now struggling to keep up with 
popular nationalist demands. The party is slowly losing its hegemony over Chinese 
nationalism and popular nationalism is already pushing for China to adopt a more aggressive 
foreign policy. 
3.3.1.3 Nationalistic demonstrations: the dynamic relation 
between CCP and popular nationalism 
 
In the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, an interesting dynamic emerged 
between the CCP and popular nationalism. This can be seen in the manner in which the CCP 
has reacted to the increasing nationalistic demonstrations. 
The fact that nationalism is a double-edge sword for the CCP, the party has adopted a strategy 
to balance the negative and positive aspects. On one hand, the CCP can tolerate, and even 
encourage, expressions of popular nationalism in defending China’s national interests, such as 
towards the Diaoyu Islands (Zhao 2013: 541, Weiss 2014: 15-27). On the other hand, the CCP 
can also ban or suppress expression of popular nationalism (Ibid).  
Which policy the CCP adopts towards the expression of nationalist sentiment depends on the 
risks and the possible gains it faces. Allowing nationalistic demonstrations in China is risky 
for the CCP because demonstrations can escalate out of control. By allowing demonstrations 
and protests, people can suddenly realize that it is acceptable and this can encourage more 
people to participate. Even though an event can start as, for example, an anti-Japanese 
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demonstration, it can quickly turn into an anti-government protest (Weiss 2014: 19).  
However, allowing nationalistic demonstrations can also be useful for the CCP. First, the CCP 
can use nationalistic demonstrations as a bargaining chip when dealing with other nations. As 
Weiss (2014: 5) writes, “visible protests provide unelected leaders a means of showcasing 
domestic pressure as leverage in diplomatic negotiations, a form of brinkmanship that 
conveys resolve and commitment to an unwavering stance”. Secondly, by allowing or 
encouraging demonstrations, it can boost the regime’s nationalistic credentials. Since 
nationalism is central to the CCPs legitimacy, allowing or encouraging nationalistic 
demonstrations is a way of signaling to nationalists that the regime is actually defending 
China’s interests.  
 
However, banning or suppressing nationalistic demonstrations is also a policy option for the 
CCP. By suppressing or banning protests, the CCP can signal its commitment to a more 
cooperative, flexible and diplomatic stance towards other nations (Weiss 2014: 16). However, 
banning or suppressing demonstrations is costly because doing so can be seen as unpatriotic, a 
betrayal of the national myth (Ibid: 20). This can seriously hurt the regime’s nationalistic 
credentials and therefore their internal legitimacy.   
 
Consequently, as Johnston and Stockman (2007: 52) write, the regime “has to walk a fine line 
between fostering negative images (thereby boosting its nationalist credentials, but harming 
its international image) and constraining popular anger (thereby protecting its external image, 
but threatening the regime’s internal legitimacy). Call this a legitimacy dilemma”. The CCP 
must weigh the possible gains up against the possible risks.  
 
In the 1990s, demonstrations were mostly suppressed. One example of this is the controversy 
over the Diaoyu Islands in 1996.  These islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Japan and 
have been a major source of friction among these countries (Gries 2004: 121-122). In 1996 a 
group of nationalists from the Japan Youth Federation repaired a lighthouse on the island to 
bolster Japanese sovereignty claims (Downs and Saunders 1998: 133). This action spurred a 
lot of nationalist “anger” in China. Books and articles were published to discuss the Diaoyu 
Islands controversy, and numerous web pages were created on the Internet by outraged 
individuals (Gries 2004: 123). As Gries (2004: 123) writes, some authors wanted to resolve 
the dispute by attacking Japan: “To the majority of contemporary Chinese, the mission of 
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containing Japan has already begun; the final battle of the Western Pacific – Protecting 
Diaoyu – has already become imminent”. 
Weiss (2014:116) writes that in the 1996 Diaoyu Island dispute, the CCP worried that by 
allowing the demonstrations China would risk the hardening of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
against China. Moreover, Downs and Saunders (1998: 135) write that China’s leaders “sought 
to quash expression of anti-Japanese sentiment for fear that they would damage Sino-Japanese 
economic relations and might turn to antigovernment protests”. Consequently, the CCP chose 
to suppress the demonstrations. They censored Internet discussions, banned protests, and 
established a heavy police presence outside the Japanese embassy. Schools were also ordered 
to inform the students that the CCP was able to defend national sovereignty. Influential 
professors and writers were warned not to express their opinions on the Diaoyu Island dispute 
(Downs and Saunders 1998: 136).  
In the end, the choice to suppress the demonstrations in 1996 did hurt the CCPs nationalistic 
credentials (Downs and Saunders 1998: 136). During the dispute, over 37, 000 letters from 
Chinese citizens, and petitions containing over 150 000 signatures were sent in to the People’s 
Daily and the People’s Liberation Daily, demanding that the CCP should aggressively defend 
the islands from Japan (Ibid: 137). The 1996 dispute over the Diaoyu Islands therefore 
demonstrated the dilemma faced by the CCP with respect to nationalistic issues, and 
illustrated the problem that nationalism could cause in terms of the legitimacy of the CCP.   
 
3.3.1.4 The 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations 
 
In September 2012, I was going to one of my first classes at Fudan University in Shanghai. I 
was just starting on my semester as an exchange student, and I remember one of my 
professors walking into class and saying, “Today I’m going to show you why we hate the 
Japanese.” This wasn’t really that unusual (aside from the use of the word hate). In my first 
lectures in other classes, we had discussed the reasons behind the island-dispute between 
China and Japan. This professor, however, opened up a 19-page pdf file on his computer with 
pictures of the Nanjing massacre. The pictures were brutal. Even so, under each picture the 
professor had written some capitations, which were arguably more worrying than the pictures 
themselves. They said: “Only Japanese can smoke while killing a human being”, and “only 
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Japanese can smile while raping”. I remember thinking to myself that this was about to be an 
interesting semester.  
The year 2012 did not begin well for the bilateral relationship between China and Japan. In 
January 2012, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Osamu Fujimura, announced that Japan was 
planning to name 39 islands, including four of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (China Daily 
17.01.2012). China reacted strongly to this, and the People’s Daily called it a direct attack, an 
attempt to harm China’s core interests (Weiss 2014: 192). The relationship would degenerate 
further during the spring as a result of various incidents20. The Island dispute considerable 
escalated when the Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro on 16 April 2012 informed that his city 
intended to buy some of the land on the Diaoyu Islands from their private owner (Reilly 2014: 
208). This led to multiple trips to the islands by Japanese and Chinese civilians during the 
summer of 2012 (McCormack 2012: 5, Weiss 2014:195). On July 7, 2012, the central 
government in Japan announced that they would buy the three islands. This was done as a 
precaution from Japans side, as they feared the relations between Japan and China would only 
be worsened if Ishihara was able to buy the islands (Weiss 2014: 195). Ishihara, a right-wing 
populist in Japan, had previously provoked the Chinese. For example, in 2007, Ishihara 
backed the movie The Truth about Nanjing, which argues that the Nanjing massacre in 1937 
was nothing more than political propaganda by the Chinese (Japan Times 25.01.2007). 
Ishihara wanted to challenge Japan’s policy of forbidding citizens from landing on the islands 
and wanted to develop facilities there, for example a fishing port (Weiss 2014: 194). On 
August 15, 2012, on the anniversary of the end of the Second World War, activists from Hong 
Kong landed on the islands, planting flags from both China and Taiwan. Four days later, a 
Japanese convoy landed on the island, planted a Japanese flag and held ceremonies honoring 
the dead during the war.  
This caused an outraged in China, and the same day as the planting of the Japanese flag on the 
islands, anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in multiple cities in China. The 
demonstrations on the August 19, 2012, took place in 51 cities in China, including Beijing, 
Shanghai, Chengdu, Hangzhou and Guangzhou21. The demonstrations were mainly peaceful, 
with some minor incidents like a number of Japanese-brand cars being overturned and 
Japanese restaurants and department stores being vandalized (Weiss 2014: 201). In Chengdu, 
                                                          
20 For example, in February, Nagoya’s mayor, Takashi Kawamura, stated that he doubted that Japanese troops 
had massacred Chinese civilians to a delegation of CCP officials from Nanjing (New York Times 22.02.2012) 
21 For a map of the locations of the August and September demonstrations, see Wallace and Weiss 2014: 13-14 
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where tens of thousands reportedly attended the demonstration, one of the banners bore the 
message “Even if China is covered with graves, we must kill all Japanese” (The Telegraph 
19.08.2012); another banner appearing in the news read “Defend the Diaoyu Islands to the 
death” (New York Times 19.08.2012).  
There was some question as to how the CCP would react to the demonstrations. On one hand, 
the demonstrations could be used as leverage towards Japan and as an attempt to stop the 
nationalization of the islands. On the other hand, the demonstrations could easily spiral out of 
control, and considering the domestic political situation, this was not something the CCP 
wanted. Bo Xilai had been removed from his post as the Party Secretary of Chongqing in 
March 2012, and it was a very delicate time for the CCP, as they would be naming new 
leaders later that year. However, according to Zhou Yongsheng, an expert on Japanese studies 
at China Foreign Affairs University, the feelings were running so high that the central 
government had accepted that it could not stop the demonstrations (South China Morning Post 
20.08.2012). The CCP therefore chose to approve the demonstration, but to manage the risk 
of triggering bigger anti-Japanese demonstrations, and worse, the potential of these larger 
demonstrations to turn into more anti-government protests. The CCP, for example, did not 
approve a large demonstration in Beijing, as this was considered too dangerous. 
The demonstrations continued in China. Between August 15 and September 9, there were 
around 60 demonstrations in Chinese cities (Wallace and Weiss 2014: 3). However, the 
reaction from China did not change the Japanese government’s mind, and on September 11, 
2012, they signed a contract and bought the three islands from the private owner (Weiss 2014: 
2014). The reaction to this was strong in China. Between September 11th and 18th, the biggest 
anti-Japanese demonstrations since the relationship between China and Japan was normalized 
in 1972 took place as over 320 anti-Japanese demonstrations in multiple cities were held. On 
September 18, the anniversary of the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, there were, on 
that date alone, demonstrations in 128 cities across China (Wallace and Weiss 2014: 2).  
Interestingly, there were also demonstrations in Hong Kong. These demonstrations were 
nowhere near as violent as some of those taking place in mainland China, but Japanese flags 
were burned and there were calls to boycott Japanese goods. However it came with some 
interesting quotes from the demonstrators which said that “Japan must apologize not only for 
the crimes it committed before and during the Second World War. This latest act by the 
Japanese state, buying the Diaoyu Islands, is an absurdity. It is a challenge to the Chinese 
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people, to the extent that it is almost an act of war.” Further, some of the demonstrators 
wanted to distance themselves from the CCP by saying: “The Chinese Communist Party has 
inflicted a lot of pain on its own people.  We are all Chinese.  It is our country.  [But] we do 
not equate the Chinese Communist Party with the country.  We know the difference” (Voice 
of America 16.09.2012).  
The responses of netizens, the cybercitizens of mainland China actively involved in online 
communities, to the dispute were more varied than the scenes we saw in the streets. There 
was, however, one thing about which there was no doubt: that Japan had “attacked” China’s 
sovereignty. However, many also expressed unhappiness with the way the demonstrations had 
been conducted and condemned the vandalism and violence that took place against Japanese 
nationals. For example, He Jiong, a celebrity TV personality, in a tweet that received over 
200,000 mostly supportive comments and retweets, wrote “Patriotism is a very noble word. 
For those compatriots who smash cars, who eat at Japanese restaurants, then curse and don’t 
pay, who assault foreigners for no reason in front of their homes, don’t degrade the word 
patriotism! The [Diaoyu] island is definitely ours, but the dignity of our country is also in our 
hands!” (The Atlantic 17.09.2012) 
If we dissect the demonstrations, we get a better overview of the protestors’ actual feelings. 
Zhang Yang (2014) was able to collect about 300 different slogans from pictures of the 
demonstrations in 2012. He was then left with around 200 slogans after “excluding highly 
repetitive and defective samples” (Zhang Yang 2014: 22).  By looking at the slogans used 
during the whole anti-Japanese demonstration in 2012, we see that there was a wide variety of 
topics for the slogans. Not surprisingly, there were slogans that directly concerned the Diaoyu 
Islands and the problems of territory and sovereignty. Slogans of this kind “emphasize the 
importance of defending national sovereignty and maintaining the territorial integrity” (Zhang 
Yang 2014: 22). Examples of this category are slogans like “Diaoyu Islands are our country’s 
divine territory” (钓鱼岛是我国的神圣领土) (Zhang Yang 2014: 24). More aggressive 
slogans were also used, such as “Defend Diaoyu Islands! Expel Japanese!” (保卫钓鱼岛，赶
走日本人！) and “Send troops to the islands!” (驻军钓鱼岛！) (Zhang Yang 2014: 25). 
Other slogans like “Opposing Japan’s nationalization’ of Diaoyu Islands” (反对日本钓鱼岛“
国有化”) are more directly linked to the issue of 2012.  
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Another category of slogans, is one that relates more to historical memories, emphasizing 
patriotism and the wish for a more powerful nation (Ibid: 22). This focus is also not 
surprising. As we have seen in the previous chapters, Chinese nationalism has deep roots in 
history, especially concerning the century of humiliation, and this was one of the main 
focuses in the Patriotic Education Campaign. This type of sentiment was evident in slogans 
like “Japan, guilty person of WWII, has no shame/bold as brass (to occupy our land)” (日本
，二战罪人，厚颜无耻。); “the pain of Nanking (Nanking Massacre), never forget” (南京
之痛，永世难忘); and “New hatred and old rancor, ‘bloodwash’ Japan” (新仇旧恨，血洗日
本) (Ibid: 32-33).  
These slogans suggest that Japan is perceived through a historical lens by the Chinese and 
suggest that, in the minds of some, there is no distinction between the atrocities committed by 
Japanese soldiers during the war, and Japan’s actions as a nation today. From this, we can see 
that the disputes with Japan about the islands are heavily linked to people’s historical memory 
of the past. 
 
The slogans from this protest also illustrate just how dangerous this demonstration actually 
was for the CCP. Nationalist demonstrations in China have also been used as an opportunity 
to protest other issues. This was evident in the 2012 demonstrations. Slogans like “Little 
Japan, get out! Secretary Bo, come back! Strongly resist GM food (genetically modified 
food)! Punish severely traitors and quislings!” (小日本滚出去，薄书记快回来！坚决抵制
转基因，严惩汉奸卖国贼!) (Zhang Yang 2014: 36) illustrate this practice. The slogan 
contains references to a mixture of different issues. It does mention Japan; however, it also 
mentions Secretary Bo (Bo Xilai), as well as genetically manipulated food. Another example 
is “Freedom, Democracy, Human Rights, Constitutionalism, Defend Diaoyu Islands” (自由 
民主 人权 宪政 保钓). These slogans demonstrate how some protestors camouflage other 
issues under a nationalist banner. However, there were some slogans that did not attempt to 
camouflage the issues: “Secretary Bo, people’s good secretary” (薄书记，人民的好书记), 
“Turn anger into strength, want political reform, want freedom!” (化愤怒为力量，要政改，
要自由！) (Zhang Yang 2014: 36-39). These are example of slogans that are directly aimed 
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towards Bo Xilai or a call for political reform. It shows that even though the demonstrations 
was mainly anti-Japanese and nationalistic, they can be overestimated as the slogans does 
show that people does use these demonstrations as an opportunity to demonstrate against 
other things, either by camouflaging them under the banner of nationalism, or by presenting 
them in the open regarding other issues. However, in reviewing the data collected by Zhang 
Yang, we can see that the overwhelming majority of the slogans in the demonstrations were 
nationalistic in nature. Approximately 15 of around 200 slogans collected by Zhang Yang 
were non-nationalistic in nature and directed towards domestic politics, ideologies and 
representative figures22.  
The CCP attempted to stay on top of the demonstrations in 2012, as the domestic political 
situation was very delicate. However, the protests between September 10 and the anniversary 
of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on September 18 began to demonstrate that the 
situation could potentially spiral out of control. Violence began to spread, and multiple attacks 
by angry protestors were reported. The most vicious incident was probably that of a Chinese 
man driving a Toyota who was almost beaten to death with an iron bar at a demonstration in 
Xi’an on September 15, 2012. His skull was smashed in and his speaking ability following the 
incident was limited to simple phrases (The Wall Street Journal 23.09.2012). On Weibo, 
people posted pictures of the demonstrations and put signs up in different shops. People were 
holding up banners were it stated “Declare war on Japan”, and other had signs that read “Hunt 
the dog-f**king Japanese and get them out of China” printed on their back. The 
demonstrations in 2012 were “the biggest anti-Japan demonstration marked by violent acts 
targeting Japanese interests, such as looting shops and restaurants, smashing Japanese-made 
cars, burning buildings of some Japanese companies and ransacking some Japanese 
supermarkets (Zhao 2013: 552) For example was a factory belonging to the Panasonic 
Corporation was set on fire in Qingdao, and a Toyota dealership was looted. In Beijing, 
Chinese military police created a barrier to prevent protesters from breaching the Japanese 
embassy, and in Shenzhen the police fired about 20 rounds of tear gas and used water cannons 
and pepper spray to repel thousands of people that had occupied a street in the city (CNN 
17.09.2012, Reuters 16.09.2012). In shops you could see many signs that stated, for example, 
“Customers who yell the “Diaoyu Islands are China’s” get 15% off. Yell “Japan is China’s, 
too” and get 20% off”. In another shop, a sign read: “Always be on guard and defend the 
                                                          
22 Of course, this number can be skewed, as the data relies on photos taken from the demonstrations.  
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Diaoyu Islands! Be ready to destroy the invading enemy at any moment!” Hotels had signs 
declaring that they did not accept Japanese customers, and a Korean hairstyle salon displayed 
signs stating that Japanese and dogs were not allowed inside. A picture circulating on the web 
showed a car dealership and its employees holding up a sign that read “We will kill every 
Japanese even if it means deaths for our own; even poverty will not deter us from reclaiming 
the Diaoyu Islands” (China Digital Times 16.09.2012, Nairland 17.09.2014). The Japanese 
Prime Minster actually had to urge the Chinese government to protect the Japanese inside 
China, as he was concerned of the safety to Japanese nationals and Japan-affiliated companies 
(Reuters 16.09.2012). 
The CCP took action. Censorship instructions to the media were sent out on September 15 23 
and on September 17 the State Council sent out an emergency directive demanding that local 
governments “ maintain order” (Reilly 2014: 211). This directive was followed by local 
governments. For example, on September 18, police in Xian, banned large protests in 
crowded areas and locations near government offices. Organizing demonstrations by text 
messaging and online messaging was forbidden (South China Morning Post 18.09.2012). 
Consequently, the demonstration on September 18 was more peaceful than those held earlier 
in the week, even though this was the day on which the most demonstrations were held. The 
directives from the State Council to the local governments had been effective, and the 
demonstration appeared to be “much better controlled than those over the weekend, which 
included extensive rioting and vandalism” (New York Times 18.09.2012). The CCP 
continued to gain control over the demonstrations. On September 19, Xinhua reported that 18 
people had been detained in Guangzhou for violence in anti-Japan protests (Xinhua 
20.09.2012). On Sina Weibo, a number of words were banned, including “anti-Japan” (反日), 
as well as smash + car (砸+车). (China Digital Times 19.09.2014). These efforts were all 
effective in calming the protests. On September 19, the Japanese embassy reported that there 
was no demonstration in front of the building (Reuters 19.09.2012).     
The demonstrations in 2012 demonstrated many things. First, that this was a genuine 
nationalistic demonstration caused by an unexpected situation. The landing on the islands by 
Japanese citizens in August was the catalyst for the anti-Japanese demonstrations that erupted 
on the same day as the landing. The CCP did allow the demonstrations in 2012, however, 
                                                          
23 The censorship instructions that was sent out to the will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
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considering the domestic situation in China at the time, allowing them to take place was 
extremely risky. On the other hand, suppressing the demonstrations would probably have had 
a negative impact on the CCP’s nationalist credentials. Again, the CCP had to evaluate the 
possible gains for allowing the demonstrations versus the possible risks.  
I would argue that, considering the situation in China at the time, the demonstrations in 2012 
were not ideal for the CCP. Yes, they helped to send an important message to Japan that 
certain actions were unacceptable and that China could use demonstrations as a diplomatic 
leverage, as Weiss (2014) points out in her book. However, the possible gain was outweighed 
by the risk caused by the domestic situation. 2012 was the year of China’s political leadership 
transition which means that new top leaders of CCP would take power to rule the country. 
China was also in the middle of dealing with Bo Xilai scandal, which has been considered the 
biggest threat to the CCP since the Tiananmen Square-incident. In sum, the domestic political 
situation in China was extremely delicate. 
However, preventing the demonstrations in 2012 would have been a massive blow to CCPs 
nationalist credentials. The cost of suppressing the 2012 demonstrations would have simply 
been too high and the demonstration may have been too spontaneous to actually suppress. As 
previous stated, some experts claim that the feelings during the 2012 island dispute were so 
intense that that CCP could not have stopped the demonstrations, even if they had wanted to 
(South China Morning post 20.08.2012). It would have been considered unpatriotic and a 
betrayal of the nationalist myth and a considerable threat to the party’s legitimacy had the 
CCP chosen to suppress the demonstrations. The CCP consequently allowed the 
demonstrations, but tried to manage them, in an attempt to avoid damaging the diplomatic 
message these demonstrations would send to Japan as well as attempting to avoid criticism 
from nationalists for not allowing the people to express their patriotic feelings.  
Secondly, the demonstrations in 2012 were mostly nationalistic in nature and, as per the 
definition used in this thesis a lot of the content of the demonstrations as aggressive 
nationalism. Some would argue that nationalistic protests in China can be overestimated, as 
people in China would use the demonstrations as an opportunity to protest against other 
things, such as domestic politics. In examining the types of slogans used during the protests, it 
can be seen that this argument does have some weight behind it, as we did see slogans 
directed towards other domestic issues. However, the large majority of the slogans were 
directed towards the island dispute and historical issues related to Japan. The historical 
 66 
 
slogans especially illustrate the way in which the islands dispute is linked to people’s 
historical perceptions, and represent the way in which Japan is viewed through a historical 
lens by China. The slogans that appeared during the demonstrations do in fact fit this paper’s 
definition of aggressive nationalism. A large majority of the demonstrators demanded a 
tougher stance towards Japan, and many called for the deployment of soldiers to defend 
China’s sovereignty. This was in many ways legitimized in the eyes of many Chinese because 
Japan’s actions with respect to the islands dispute were seen as a threat to China’s 
sovereignty, but also legitimized because of Japans history.    
Thirdly, even though the CCP tried to stay on top of the demonstrations, the protests did start 
to spiral out of control. The second-wave of demonstrations that occurred between 10 
September and 18 September were particularly violent. As the anniversary of the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria drew closer, the CCP took action to gain control over the 
demonstrations. They arrested protestors and the official media organizations, such as Xinhua, 
wrote about it. The CCP did this as a way of signaling that it was no longer acceptable to 
demonstrate. They also sent directives to local government and the media, as well as banning 
a number of keywords on Sina Weibo. These measures proved to be an effective means of 
managing the potential volatility of the protests and after 18 September, the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations had died down. In other words, in order to calm the protestors, the CCP used 
almost every tool available to them (without using direct force).  
These points are very interesting for my hypotheses, and I will consequently turn to this now. 
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3.3.2 The attractiveness and the danger of the nationalist card 
 
How attractive is the nationalist card in China? And, does nationalism in China have 
aggressive traits? 
Firstly, nationalism is an extremely attractive idea in China. As I mentioned earlier, the 
Patriotic Education Campaign is considered a major success in China, partly because the ideas 
were already present in Chinese society. Personal stories about the war in China were not able 
to enter the space of public discourse, as prior to the Patriotic Education Campaign, the state 
had tight control of memory institutions (Yinan He 2007b: 50). However, the Patriotic 
Education Campaign supplemented these ideas and made nationalism into an accepted 
ideology in China. Consequently, China has one of the highest levels of popular nationalism 
in the world, as was shown in the previous cited research by Wenfang Tang and Darr. This 
can be seen in the issues with Japan and the anti-Japanese demonstrations as it invokes 
extreme passion in China. Consequently, for threatened elites in China, playing the nationalist 
card in a democratization process would appear to be a very attractive strategy.  
This leads to the second point, namely the danger of playing the nationalist card in China. 
Nationalism in China is heavily linked to anti-Japanese views. Going back to my definition of 
aggressive nationalism, we can therefore define Chinese nationalism as aggressive towards 
Japan. As previously noted, the Chinese nationalists during the anti-Japanese demonstrations 
in 2012 did not seem to differential between Japan’s past wrongdoings, and those of 
contemporary Japan. In China, Japan is seen through a particular historical lens and Japan is 
consequently considered to be more threatening than other states because of this.  
Also, the CCP is struggling to keep up with nationalistic demands. Nationalism is already 
providing pressure on the CCP in the area of foreign policy. As seen from the 2012-
demonstrations, nationalist protests can spiral out of control. When a demonstration spirals 
out of control, it can easily turn in to nationalistic bidding war between elites attempting to get 
the support of the masses.  
Strong institutions are therefore necessary to check elite manipulation and myth making in 
China. I would therefore turn towards the media, which has the potential to act as a regulator 
in the marketplace of ideas and a check on nationalist myth making, and might serve as a 
means to mitigate the danger of aggressiveness in a democratization process in China.  
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3.4 Media 
 
A well-regulated marketplace of ideas is important in a democratizing state. As I’ve written 
previously, in the early stages of a democratization process when democratic institutions are 
not fully entrenched, the state and other elites are forced to engage in public debate in order to 
compete for mass allies and popular support in the struggle for power. It is in this type of 
situation that political leaders and elites have the motivation and the opportunity to play the 
nationalist card (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 6). The marketplace of ideas is no guarantee 
against nationalism and other ideas that one may dislike, however a well-regulated 
marketplace of ideas will allow debate to take place to evaluate the evidence and the 
consequences of following a special policy.  
A well-regulated marketplace of ideas will consequently have the benefit of institutions and 
mechanisms that work to correct errors. If these mechanisms are missing, there is an 
opportunity for elites to use “false advertising” to attract popular support in a bidding war 
with other elites. This “false advertisement” will not be prevented by experts, or an open 
debate in which the falsity of the advertisement is scrutinized and exposed because in the 
early stages of democratization, these mechanisms are weak. These mechanisms include the 
presence of professional journalists with training in “the verification of sources and separation 
of fact from opinion, and the development of expert evaluative institutions whose prestige 
depends on maintaining a reputation for objectivity” (Snyder and Ballentine: 22). If these 
mechanisms are present, they can effectively mitigate the propagation of falsifiable nationalist 
myths and force competing arguments to be confronted, allowing the public to evaluate the 
foundation of policies and their consequences.  (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 22).  
As seen here, the media can therefore be an important check towards the elite’s manipulation 
and their use of the nationalist mythmaking and false advertising. A professional media that 
can be objective and inform the public with a balanced view will therefore be important, as it 
can reveal factual inaccuracies, contradictions and help the public to evaluate the costs of 
acting on their implications (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 12). However, if these mechanisms 
are missing and the greater the market imperfections are, then the greater the likelihood for 
mythmaking that promote conflict. Therefore, it will be important to see if the Chinese media 
can have this role as a check towards the elite’s manipulation and nationalist myth-making. 
This is my aim in this section.  
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First, I’ll briefly review the partial freeing of the media and the commercialization of media 
organizations that occurred in post-reform China. From there, I’ll examine the 
professionalism of the Chinese media, and in particular look at investigative journalism. 
Investigative journalism is seen as one of the main sources of professionalism in the Chinese 
media, as it has introduced some important norms and values to the journalist profession.  
The most important aspect of this section is the relationship between the media and popular 
nationalism discussed in the previous section. Did the Chinese media provide reasonably 
objective and balanced information during the crises, especially the issues with Japan? Again, 
are the Chinese media able to function as a check towards national myth-making?  
My findings in this paper does raises questions about whether media professionalism has 
progressed sufficiently for competition in the marketplace of ideas to function.  
3.4.1 The Chinese media 
 
3.4.1.1 Commercialization and media freedom in China 
 
On July 19, 2012, the French luxury brand Louis Vuitton took over the front page of the state-
run newspaper China Daily’s July 19 issue with a full-page advertisement. The front page had 
just three other small headlines at the top of the paper, which was otherwise completely 
dominated by the advertisement.   
In Mao’s China, this would have been unthinkable. Before 1978, all newspapers were owned 
by the state and all aspects of their operations and finances were administered by the state. 
Therefore, in pre-reform China, journalism was almost non-existing, and it was only 
propaganda. The media was in many ways the throat and tongue of the party, and “their sole 
purpose was to mobilize public support by acting as loudspeakers for CCP policies” (Shirk 
2011: 7). As a result, in 1979, there were approximately 280 state-run newspapers in China 
(Stockman 2013: 56).   
However, in 1978, the CCP made a decision with profound consequences for the Chinese 
media system. At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Party Congress, the CCP 
decided to relax control over domestic and international flows of information with the goal of 
fostering initiative, innovation, and economic growth.  Media outlets were now intended to 
serve both the state and the market, and therefore government subsidies for newspapers, 
magazines and television stations were substantially cut. In 1979 advertising was allowed, and 
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four years later media organizations were allowed to keep the profits they generated from 
selling ads (Shirk 2011: 8). 
 
The choice to commercialize the media market was mainly made as a result the reforms 
instituted at the end of the 1970s. As part of its economic reforms, the central government 
pursued a policy of decentralization to redistribute wealth from the central governments to 
local governments, enterprises and individuals. Consequently, the central government was not 
able to finance technological development in the media sector. (Stockmann 2013: 61). At the 
same time, there was also a growing market for media in China and the public demand also 
grew. This amazing growth in possible media consumers created an opportunity for the 
advertising industry to make money. For the new media outlets, this created another possible 
new source of income other than state subsidies. The opportunity therefore created a solution 
for the central government. Commercialization of the media made sense in the modernization 
of China. 
 
Because of the reforms, Chinese media therefore experienced an incredible growth. From 
1979 to 2002, the number of magazines titles increased by more than 871 %, the number of 
book titles increased by 1040 % and the number of newspaper titles increased by 1049 % 
(Tang 2005: 84). As seen in the graph from Stockmann’s (2013: 56): book Media 
Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China, there was exceptional growth in the 
number of newspapers in the 80s. With the massacre at Tiananmen Square we can see a fall, 
before the number of newspapers stabilized from the mid-90s and onwards. Consequently, the 
media environment in China today is a complex market with many actors. To make sense of 
this environment, it is normal to divide the newspaper sector into two or three main types. 
These include both commercialized newspapers and official (party-led) newspapers. It is also 
possible to add a third category: semiofficial. The official newspapers are less commercialized 
and liberalized than the commercialized papers, and usually receive indirect subsidies through 
subscriptions by party and state units (Stockmann 2011: 179). The official newspapers are 
however also commercialized, but they depend less on the market because they still receive 
some indirect subsidies from the party. Official newspapers are consequently more closely 
linked to the CCP, and therefore they are also referred to as party-led newspapers. Examples 
of official newspapers are Jimin Ribao (The English version is called People’s Daily) and the 
Beijing Daily. In contrast, commercialized newspapers (as well as semiofficial ones) are 
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financed completely through advertising. Examples of this type of newspaper are the Global 
Times and Southern Weekend.   
Commercialization of the Chinese media has however not produced a free press by any 
stretch of the imagination. Freedom House ranks China as one of the most restrictive media 
environments in the world with a score of 84, with only eleven countries in the world have a 
worse score (Freedom House 2014). On the Reporters without Borders Annual Worldwide 
Press Freedom Index, China is ranked as the sixth least free media environment in the world 
(World Press Freedom Index 2014). China’s scores in the annual report from Freedom House 
have been quite stable since 1993, so greater commercialization has not really affected 
China’s score on this report when it comes to media freedom.  
Despite the commercialization, the media is still highly regulated by the CCP. This is mainly 
done through the licensing system, where the CCP can limit the number of licenses granted. 
To get a license, a newspaper needs to get a sponsor from their level of government. The rank 
of the sponsor determines the administrative rank of the newspaper, as well as its scope of 
circulation. For example, the party-led newspapers (dangbao) are registered under a CCP 
party committee and they function as the mouthpiece of the CCP at their respective level of 
government. Newspapers like the People’s Daily are sponsored by the Propaganda 
Department under the CCP Central Committee. Consequently, the People’s Daily represents 
the viewpoints of the Chinese national leadership, and it can be circulated all over the country 
(Stockmann 2013: 52). A newspaper like the Beijing Daily is registered under the Propaganda 
Department at the Beijing municipal level. Consequently, the Beijing Daily is only allowed to 
distribute its newspaper in Beijing (Ibid).  
 
Being the sponsor, the state and party are in a position to influence and restrict different 
decisions of the newspapers. Therefore, the license necessary for the newspapers comes with 
a price and the CCP can restrict the content of publications and in some cases revoke the 
license altogether (Qian Gang and Bandurski 2011: 43). The licenses are given out by the 
GAPP24, which is the government institution responsible for press policies, including 
“licensing, investigation, and prosecution of illegal publications” (Stockmann 2013: 53). 
Through this institution, the CCP is able to decide when, where, by whom and how many 
                                                          
24 General Administration of Press and Publication 
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newspapers can be founded, as well to determine the manner in which the newspapers 
industry is organized and its relationship to the party.  
In addition to the GAPP, the CCP’s very powerful Propaganda Department is established at 
every level of the party. This is an old institution that can trace it beginnings to 1922 and has 
been operating continuously (with the exception of a ten year period during the Cultural 
Revolution) ever since (Shambaugh 2007: 34). The exact structure of this department is not 
well known to outsiders since it is a very secretive body. However, the Propaganda 
Department is “involved in editorial supervision exerted in the form of pre- and post-
publication censorship” (Stockmann 2013: 53). Usually this censorship is performed before 
publication through a combination of standing rules and instructions from the Party 
Authorities, as well as through informal norms and content regulations. If a newspaper breaks 
any of the norms or content regulations, the Propaganda Department can conduct a post-
publication censorship by contacting senior editors at the newspaper and they can also affect 
the employment of media staff. Worst case scenario, this can also lead to jailing of the 
journalists who write articles in violation the norms and content regulations. However, the 
response from the Propaganda Department on such an article deemed inappropriate can come 
months after its publication. Because of the insecurity this potential post-publication 
censorship presents, self-censorship is one of the major forms of media control in China 
(Hassid 2010: 10). 
As the commercialization of the media created an incredible number of new media 
organizations, the CCP adjusted its framework to maintain its capacity to control the media, 
going from managing the media at a micro-level, to managing at macro-level, guiding the 
overall development instead of managing specific aspects of the sector. Therefore the 
commercialization of the media took place inside an institutional structure that allowed the 
propaganda authorities to intervene in various decisions of the media organizations, for 
instance personnel changes and editorial policies (Stockmann 2013: 66). Since most of the 
censorship decisions are made post hoc, news workers do not have clear guidance regarding 
which stories or topics will create trouble for them weeks or months after publication25. The 
secrecy and unpredictability of the decisions made by the Propaganda Department, as well as 
                                                          
25 Of course, some topics involve less uncertainty, like the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre and Taiwanese 
independence etc.   
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the GAPP, create an environment of self-censorship, as news workers live in what Hassid 
(2010) calls a “regime of uncertainty”.  
Even though media control is strict in China, we can nonetheless argue that the 
commercialization of the Chinese media represents a partial freeing. In commercializing the 
Chinese media, the state had to tolerate a certain degree of autonomy by media outlets. 
Together with greater autonomy, we have also seen that the discursive space in Chinese media 
has become greater, allowing them to cater to audiences in order to attract advertising. Since 
the commercialization of the media, the CCP has opened up for topics to be discussed in the 
media. However, the choice of topics and the openness of the space allowed depends “in a 
large part on the extent to which the central government can find allies among the audiences 
for its policy goals” (Stockmann 2013: 139).  If there is little conflict, topics are allowed and 
the space widens.  
A good example of this widening of space can be seen in reporting on environmental and 
corruption issues, as well as reporting on foreign policy. This type of reporting on foreign 
policy has to be seen in the context of the rise of popular nationalism in China, and that CCP 
has opened up the discursive space when it comes to international news “to deal with 
pressures and constraints inflicted on the central government by popular nationalism” 
(Stockmann 2013: 140). This is something I will come back to later in this section. Reporting 
on environmental and corruption issues will be touched upon in the next section when I will 
go through the rise of investigative journalism in China.  
Even though the reporting on these issues can be negative, it does not usually go against the 
policy goals of the CCP. These issues, as we will see, are largely directed towards lower-level 
officials, and here the CCP has had an interest in the media in the role of a watchdog. 
However, when reporting on these issues goes against the party’s interests, as we will see in 
the case of investigative journalism, the discursive space gets narrower and the topics become 
more restricted.  
 
3.4.1.2 The rise of investigative journalism 
 
As has been discussed, there has been a phenomenal growth in the media in China. However, 
this does not necessarily lead to a more professional media. Actually, can we argue that the 
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commercialization of the media has made it more superficial and more interested in selling 
than actually delivering quality journalism. This has led to a problem for the legitimacy for 
the journalistic profession. Episodes in which the media have even created news stories to 
boost sales are not uncommon in China. Xiguang Li, the executive dean of the School of 
Journalism and Communication at Beijing's Tsinghua University, said in an interview that in 
2005 all the media outlets, newspapers and television ran a story stating that the vaccine for 
Hepatitis B was poisonous.  When scientists and experts later came to the conclusion that this 
was wrong, the Minister of Health in China didn’t want to say this because he didn’t want to 
contradict what journalists and the media in China had said, as he considered the opinions of 
the press to be identical to public sentiment (Interview from onthemedia.org). Further, he 
explains:  
“In China, there is a low threshold for entering the career of journalist because of the 
tendency of commercialization. The editor and the owner want to hire low-paid 
journalist, so they hire high school students instead of college graduates. And these 
high school students don't have a good knowledge of medical science or 
environmental science, so whenever an environmental or medical issue takes place, 
they only pay attention to the scandal involved but not the scientific aspect. So, as a 
result of the river pollution a couple of months ago, the mayor of that city, under the 
pressure, killed himself because of the media. So do we want to see people kill 
themselves under the pressure of press?” (Ibid) 
The commercialization of the media has also created an environment where reporting of soft 
news and the tendency to dumb down issues are becoming a trend26.  
However, after the media-reforms in the 1980s and the commercialization of the industry, 
there was a rise in investigative journalism in the 1990s, which can arguably be considered 
one of the most significant developments in Chinese journalism during that period. 
Investigative journalism has been benefitting the journalism profession in China and has been 
a main source for its further professionalism. The rise of investigative journalism is often 
presented as the main source of professionalism in the Chinese media (De Burgh 2003, Tong 
2011, Hassid 2010). 
Investigative journalism has flourished in China over the last 30 years as a result of the 
commercialization and an opening of the discursive space in China, as part of the macro 
strategy that I previously mentioned (De Burgh 2003b, Baum 2008, Tong and Sparks 2009, 
                                                          
26 This is possibly a general trend in the global media. It may also be a strategy many newspapers resorted to 
because of a loss in readership in the 2000s. For more on this issue, read Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001: 84-92) 
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Tong 2011). Due to increased commercialization, competition in the media market in China 
became harsh. In this increasingly competitive environment, the media embraced the idea of 
change and they welcomed “new genres of journalism that could produce diversified media 
outlets attractive to advertisers and individual subscribers.” (Tong 2011: 37) There was a need 
for longer journalistic stories and to give things that the public actually liked. Therefore, from 
a financially perspective, investigate journalism was quite attractive. 
The political attitude towards investigative journalism also helped in the early days. The 
central government needed the media to supervise the lower governments, local cadres and 
local business people (Tong 2011: 38). This media supervision was mainly aimed at exposing 
social injustice, corruption and wrongdoings of the powerful and rich. The positive political 
attitude towards investigative journalism is very noticeable when considering the television 
program Focus, which first aired on CCTV in 1994. The program was one of the first of its 
kind and it aimed to shed light on social and political problems (Qian Gang and Bandurski 
2011: 41). The program was, as executive producer at CCTV Li Xioaping explains:  
“An attempt to test public opinion and the receptivity of the government to criticism in 
a more open society and in a more economically competitive environment. It shows 
that the media can act as more than just a government mouthpiece and can play a role, 
albeit a limited one, in matters such as the fight against corruption” (Cited in Chan 
2010: 8). 
 
 This initiative from an official TV channel was publicly supported by top leaders, including 
Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji (Tong and Sparks 2009: 339). Their support validated 
and even encouraged reporting of this kind.  
Because of the positive political attitude and the competition in the media market, China 
experienced a boom in investigative journalism in the 1990s. Local TV channels followed the 
Focus program with their own similar programs, for example Guangdong TV’s Social Focus 
(Tong 2011: 39). This was followed up in the print-media, where influential newspapers like 
Southern Weekend, Southern Metropolitan Daily, Dahe Daily and Beijing News were 
established which promoted investigative journalism (Tong and Sparks 2009: 339). These 
newspapers became incredibly successful, demonstrating the actual popularity of investigative 
journalism in China. Dahe Daily was, for example, founded in 1995. After one influential 
piece in 1997, this newspaper grew from a circulation of 75 000, to around 226 000, and by 
2003 the paper had a circulation of 800 000. The advertising revenue also grew substantially 
in the same period: from 3.2 million RMB in 1997, to around 300 million RMB in 2003 
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(Tong and Sparks 2009: 339). Investigative journalism was, and still is, very popular and 
therefore profitable for the commercial media. As a consequence, there is a drive to produce 
good and investigative pieces in a number of areas. 
Investigative journalism in China is different from daily journalism in many ways. The 
investigations are often time-consuming and more expensive than other types of daily 
journalism. Investigations also goes much further into stories, often going beyond what is 
stated by authorities, and at times these reports question official narratives (Tong 2011: 13). 
Because of the higher demands in terms of time and money involved in producing 
investigative articles when comparison to daily journalism, journalists require financial 
guarantees, and in some cases political protection (Ibid). Consequently, investigative 
journalists are a big investment for Chinese newspapers.  
Investigative journalism has made it into different areas in China. One of these areas is 
environmental protection. Here the Chinese media have been very active, and their role has 
been crucial in a number of decisions. In 2003, the local media in Sichuan Province mobilized 
public opinion against a planned dam near Dujiangyan, an ancient irrigation system 
designated as a World Heritage site. The plan for this was eventually stopped as a result of 
pressure from the media and nongovernmental environmental organizations (Baum 2008: 
176). Another example of this is an investigation of the destruction of an endangered species 
of elephants in Yunnan. The broadcast, which was aired on TV, reported that:  
“Elephants in Yunnan were killed by peasants because they had invaded their 
crops…the program investigated and found that the peasants were desperately 
poor and therefore one could feel sympathy for them, even if they had killed 
an endangered species; the program went further though and found that the 
original feeding grounds of the elephants had been polluted.” (De Burgh 
2003a: 804) 
Another incredibly popular area of investigative reporting is the exposure of party cadres’ 
misdeeds. In 2006, despite an order by the Central Propaganda Department banning media 
coverage of the incident, an official outlet of the Xinhua News Agency published a story 
about an education bureau employee who was transferred from his job and was briefly jailed 
after writing a satirical poem criticizing local government incompetence (Baum 2008: 176-
177). The report led to the local mayor being called in for questioning by the central 
government. The case of Xinhua illustrates how the media is pushing boundaries when faced 
with sensitive issues. As one journalist at Xinhua said:  
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“We must respond to events very promptly and take action very quickly. We must act 
quicker than the Central Propaganda Department (CPD). We need to become the first 
wave of the hurricane. By the time CPD wakes up, we must have done our job. They 
(officials of the CPD) then can do nothing to us. They might be angry at us, but the 
masses are happy” (Cited in Xin Xin 2012: 65). 
The year 2003 can in many ways be seen as a peak year in investigative journalism (Chen 
2010, Tong and Sparks 2009, Tong 2011). In the 90s, investigative journalism was in many 
ways used to facilitate implementation of central policy in various localities, which is what 
media supervision meant for the CCP. In 2003 however, we see that “investigative journalists 
started calling the policies and policy making of the central government into question” (Tong 
2011: 50).  Two very interesting cases of this are the SARS controversy and the Sun Zhigang-
incident27.  
As previously noted, the aftermath of the Sun Zhigang incident showed great promise for 
developing the rule of law in China when legal experts issued a petition to abolish the 
detention system. However, without the help of the media, this would have never happened 
and Sun Zhigang’s killers would have gone unpunished (Liebman 2011: 159). A report in 
Southern Metropolis Daily initially drew public attention to the case. The report explored the 
reasons behind Sun’s detention and death, raising questions about the contents of official files 
on the case (Qian Gang and Bandurski 2011: 63). It was an exhaustive investigation, which 
also cited local Guangzhou regulations, showing that Sun should have not been detained once 
his friend had produced Sun’s identification card (Hand 2006: 122). The report was followed 
up by an editorial stressing the importance of the case and emphasizing the idea that it could 
have happened to anyone:  
“In a state apparatus of a great country, who is not a nobody?  …Who is not an 
ordinary citizen? (Dongfang Wang cited in Hand 2006: 122) 
The outrage surrounding the Sun Zhigang case demonstrates that investigative journalism 
could pose a real threat to the CCP. This added to the already growing discontent from the 
China’s provinces, where the local cadres had been the main target of investigative reporting 
in the 90s. From 2003 onwards, therefore, we begin to see restrictions on investigative 
reporting as the CCP tightened up the environment in which the media could operate. For 
                                                          
27 As written in the section on the Rule of Law in China, Sun Zhigang was a migrant worker who was beaten to 
death while in police custody for not having his residence permit. This caused a massive reaction in the media 
and the public in China; in the end it brought an end to legal discrimination against migrants.    
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example, the editors of Southern Metropolitan Daily, who helped break the news about both 
the SARS epidemic and the Sun Zhigang incident were prosecuted (Hand 2006: 184). They 
were wrongly accused of corrupt practices, an approach that seems to be a popular method for 
the CCP to get rid of journalists with whom they are displeased over political matters (Hassid 
2011: 828). After the reports, a propaganda official became Deputy-Editor-in-Chief at 
Southern Metropolis Daily (Tong 2011: 59). Following the political crackdown, the 
newspaper  criticized by its own journalists and by its journalist peers as no longer carrying 
the spirit of Southern Metropolis Daily (Ibid: 62). The Sun Zhigang-incident is consequently 
also a good example of the “regime of uncertainty” that creates an incentive for self-
censorship in China. The consequences of the reporting on the incident came months after it 
was published. The journalistic piece, which was mainly directed towards local government, 
turned into something much bigger and the CCP took action. Consequently, there was post-
publication censorship involved, as the CCP jailed journalists that broke the news regarding 
the Sun Zhigang-incident.  
Another example of a tougher stance against investigative journalism is that in 2004, the 
Central Propaganda Department banned yidi jiandu. This is “the practice of reporting on the 
alleged wrongdoings of officials in other provinces” (Chan 2010: 11). This kind of ban on 
cross-regional reporting has seriously injured investigative journalism in China. Since 
newspapers are through the licensing system directly linked to Party committees at the same 
administrative level, they were often not able to report on cases or issue criticisms of events in 
their own region. However, this meant that the local governments had no power to intervene 
in the case of newspapers reporting from other regions. Cross-regional reporting was therefore 
in many ways the bread and butter of investigative journalism.  
The appeal of investigative journalism has diminished for commercialized newspapers as a 
consequence of the tougher stance from the CCP. The decline in investigative journalism is 
noticeable when looking at the newspapers that became famous for their investigative 
reporting from the mid-1990s to the beginning of the 2000s, including Southern Weekend, 
Dahe Daily, Southern Metropolis Daily, and Beijing News. All of these newspapers have 
either had editorial changes, or experienced crackdowns or arrests of investigative journalists. 
Consequently, there has been a decline in the amount of investigative reporting published in 
these newspapers (Tong 2011: 62).  The reason for the decline is that there are huge 
advantages to playing on the same side as the CCP, and most newspaper organizations have 
now also grown substantially and are more established than they were at the when the reforms 
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were first established. Consequently, they have more to lose and are therefore more hesitate in 
pursuing the kind of investigative journalism that can enrage the authorities and potentially 
lead to political punishment (Tong 2011: 60). However, investigative journalism is not dead 
in China, and important cases of investigative journalists reporting on serious issues are still 
present. Examples of influential investigative reports are the scandal of the live human organ 
transplant experiments in 2006 and the 2008 milk scandal28.  
Even though media environment has become less conducive to investigative journalism since 
2003, this form of journalism has had an important effect on the journalistic profession in 
China when it comes to its professionalism.  It is important to notice that fellow journalists 
admire investigative journalism. When Hugo De Burgh (2005: 142) interviewed different 
people inside the journalistic profession, all of the interviewers stated that investigative 
journalists were the journalists they most admired. Everyone stated that the magazines or 
newspapers that were famous for their investigative journalism were the ones they mostly 
wanted to work for. Even though investigative journalism has lost some of its glamour since 
2003, it still alive in the Chinese media and has been an important element in establishing 
professional values and norms within the journalistic profession in China (Tong 2011: 99). 
3.4.1.3 Investigative journalism and its effect on the   
marketplace of ideas 
  
Snyder and Ballantine (1996) write that in order for the media to be a regulator in the 
marketplace of ideas, there is a need for a professional media that provide objective coverage 
of events by digging out the truth, informing the public with balanced and accurate reporting, 
and revealing factual inaccuracies, contradictions and the cost of acting on their implications 
(Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 12). These values of objectivity and truth seeking are qualities 
that investigative journalism has been instrumental in establishing in China’s journalistic 
profession.  
The notion of seeking the truth is a key aspect of the journalistic profession in general, as 
described in Elements of Journalism by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001: 56-68). This value is 
also central to the definition of investigative journalism: “an investigative journalist is a man 
or woman whose profession it is to discover the truth and to identify lapses from it in 
                                                          
28 For more on these, see Tong 2011: 63 
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whatever media may be available” (De Burgh 2008: 10). The notion of seeking the truth is 
also very central to the investigative journalists in China. The investigative report needs to 
provide an account of reality that is different from the official version. Investigative 
journalists in China want to reveal the “real” meanings of events that have likely been 
obscured and distorted by the powerful (Tong 2011: 99). This is a commitment to the notion 
of fact checking and accuracy in their reporting, and the “willingness and ability of 
investigative journalists and news organizations to provide important and reliable 
information” (Ibid). Cho (2009: 10) writes that media control by the CCP makes this notion of 
truth seeking difficult; however, this notion of seeking out the truth has become more 
integrated into many journalistic minds in China since the rise of investigative journalism.  As 
one of the founding editors of Southern Weekend put it, “we may have truths we cannot tell, 
but we will not tell lies” (Ibid).  
 
Objective reporting is also central for a well-regulated marketplace of ideas. Journalists 
should not necessarily be neutral, but should present their reporting with fairness and a 
balance of viewpoints, so that the reader can make up their own minds. In China, investigative 
journalists try to avoid expressing their own views directly, and ensure their reports include 
facts and views from news sources. They also try to balance their reports by including 
comments from ordinary citizens and officials, since their understanding is that “including the 
official views is to give a sense of balance to reports. The readers can judge who is telling the 
truth and who is lying if they see two viewpoints in the reports” (Tong 2011: 100). This is one 
of the central values of investigative journalists in China, as Tong (2011: 125-126) discovered 
by interviewing central investigative journalists at Southern Metropolis Daily, the paper that 
reported on the Sun Zhigang-incident.  
 
 
The investigative journalism in China has been central to establishing values such as the 
notion of truth-seeking and objectivity in the journalistic profession. However, the pressure 
from the market and advertisers can undermine these values to function correctly in a well-
regulated marketplace of ideas.  
 
In China, the process of commercialization has meant that part of the power to influence a 
news organization’s editorial decisions has been transferred from the party to advertisers and 
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the public. News organizations in China has therefore now please not only the CCP, but also 
the public (Cho 2009: 13). This was evident with the rise of investigative journalism in the 
90s, because this was mainly driven forward by market forces. As previous stated, the 
exposure of local cadres and their misdeeds is popular among the readers. So in China’s 
newly commercialized media market there were forces pulling the media in the direction of 
investigative journalism, since its advertising potential was massive. One example of this is 
Southern Weekly, which as Chou (2009: 14) writes: “Continued to respond to market pressure 
that demanded more corruption exposes. It kept distribution and street sale logs, and regularly 
discussed them during weekly staff meetings, where the cover story for the next issue is 
determined”. These types of pressures aren’t ones that are only occurring in China. In western 
news organizations, the problems of market pressures and their effect on journalistic quality 
are highly debated (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001: 69). 
However, in China, the way journalists are employed makes them relative weak to market 
pressures. With commercialization, the Propaganda Department abolished permanent 
employment and introduced a performance-based contract system. The income for journalists 
is now tied to their performance and output, meaning the number of articles and how many 
readers it attracts (Stockmann 2013: 60-61). In addition, bonuses and promotions are also tied 
to these measures, creating an environment in which journalists in China are incredibly 
exposed to market pressures. A 2010 study found that almost every journalist of the 123 
included rated the demands of the media audience as one of the key factors influencing their 
reporting of foreign news (Ibid).  
 
Consequently, some important norms and values have been established by investigative 
journalism in China. The notion of objectivity and balanced reporting, is central in the values 
established by investigative journalism in China, as the research done by Tong (2011) shows, 
and are elements that are important for a well-regulated marketplace of ideas. However, some 
elements raises questions about whether media professionalism has progressed sufficiently for 
competition in the marketplace of ideas to function. The weakness of the Chinese journalists 
towards the market pressure can consequently pose difficulties as sometimes the pressure in 
the market will be towards for example inaccurate nationalistic reporting that can contribute 
to elite mythmaking. To report balanced and accurate in these situations are central in the idea 
of a well-regulated marketplace of ideas.  
 
I will now turn towards the media and its coverage of Japan.  
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3.4.1.4 The media and its coverage of Japan 
 
Firstly, I will say a little about the discursive space in the Chinese media when it comes to 
foreign news. In the past, most international news received little attention from the Chinese 
media and the presentation of international events had mainly been guided by CCP 
propaganda officials. However, this has become more open to interpretation than was the case 
in the past (Shiming 2007) and we are now seeing a lot of different media actors reporting on 
international news. The growth in players in this area is mainly due to the incredible demand 
for international news in China today. Various research reports have shown that the motive 
for people watching television in China was to “know about current affairs inside and outside 
China” (Shirk 2011: 227). Market research performed by newspaper editors indicates that 
international news is one of the most popular topics, behind only sports in its appeal (Ibid). 
We can also see the popularity of international news when looking at newspapers like 
Reference News and Global Times, two newspapers that mainly cover international stories. 
Both newspapers have been extremely popular, with the Global Times being one of the most 
profitable newspapers in China.   
Today, editors and journalists are surprisingly quite unconstrained regarding international 
news, and compared to domestic news, “international news consist of less taboo topics, and 
few topics require self-censorship” (Stockmann 2013: 91). This is mainly because the 
Propaganda Department does not have any prescribed instructions on how to report on 
international events and often no instructions at all are sent out to news agencies. The 
commercialized media is therefore quite free to listen more to the market than to the 
Propaganda Department when it comes to coverage of international news.    
As Reilly (2012) and Stockmann (2013) write, the news coverage of issues around Japan is 
often unconstrained in the beginning and especially right after a “crisis”. As a Guangzhou 
editor noted, when relations between China and Japan are bad they have more leeway to 
report on the negative aspects of the relationship (Reilly 2012: 195). This has to be seen in the 
context of the CCP’s overall strategy of handling of nationalistic protests, as discussed in the 
chapter on nationalism. Most of the time in China, public anger, for example anti-Japanese 
activism, tends to emerge in response to an unexpected incident (Reilly 2012: 40). When there 
are initial signs of potential protests and media reporting on the international incident, the 
 83 
 
CCP has to choose between toleration and suppression. If this is tolerated, and this initial 
signs is not censored, this has a signaling effect that reporting is considered ok, and the media 
take advantage of the opportunity to report on the issue. Reporting on issues with Japan is 
allowed until the CCP considers it starts to go against its own policy. For example, if a protest 
is starting to go out of control, the discursive space on the issue in the Chinese media will 
become narrower. Consequently, the news reporting on Japan is actually quite “free” at the 
start of a crisis when it is initially tolerated by the CCP. This tells us something about the role 
of the media as a regulator when it comes to nationalistic issues in the marketplace of ideas.    
Research on Chinese media does show some interesting tendencies when it comes to the 
reporting on Japan. In his research, Reilly (2012) discovered that in Chinese reports on Japan, 
there was a significant difference in the negativity and the sensationalism between the reports 
of commercial newspapers and those of the Party-led newspapers. His research builds on 
previous studies examining this topic. In 2004, research done by the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences compared the coverage of Japan in the People’s Daily with six commercial 
newspapers between January and October, finding that the commercial press was far more 
negative in their reporting. The People’s Daily focused more on leaders’ visits and China-
Japan cultural exchanges, while the more commercial press focused on the historic issues and 
topics concerning the Japanese military (Cited in Reilly 2012: 115). Reilly expanded on this 
research, looking at the coverage of twelve newspapers (six commercial and six party-led) 
between 2001 and 2008. Between 2001 and 2005, Reilly found that the party-led newspapers 
did not encourage anti-Japanese sentiments, and that they focused more on the official aspects 
of the bilateral relationship. The state-led newspapers were in general considerably more 
positive in their coverage of Japan (Reilly 2012: 116). The approach of the commercial press 
was quite different. Commercial newspapers contained substantially more coverage on 
historical issues, such as the Yasakuni Shrine, the Nanjing Massacre, the invading Japanese 
army and comfort women. The commercial newspapers had also more coverage on 
controversial security issues (Ibid). Consequently, Reilly discovered that between 2001 and 
2005, the party-led newspapers had a “far more balanced and objective coverage of Japan, 
then their commercial and far more market-oriented counterparts” (Reilly 2012: 120).  
Regarding the difference between commercial and the party-led newspapers in terms of their 
reporting, one editor of a commercial newspaper in Reilly’s research explained:  
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“As tension mounted in China-Japan relations during that period, we felt that we were 
free to report on more negative aspects of the relationship. Since these stories were not 
criticized by our superiors, we knew that we could keep going” (Reilly 2012: 120).  
Concerning to the reason commercial and more market-oriented newspapers print 
sensationalist and negative news on Japan, one journalist from a local newspaper in Hunan 
province explained that “after all, we have to sell newspapers to survive” (Ibid). And one 
reporter from the Global Times noted that the circulation of the newspaper was highest when 
it had, for example, former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on its front page 
(Reilly 2012: 117-118).  
After the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 the CCP tried to keep anti-Japanese 
demonstrations to a minimum, as Japan and China tried to repair their bilateral relationship 
(Weiss 2014: 163). Because of this, anti-Japanese sentiments were suppressed in that period, 
and there were no major anti-Japanese demonstrations from 2006 to 2010 (Weiss 2014: 160-
188). Consequently, the discursive space surrounding Japan also narrowed in the Chinese 
media. There were multiple signals communicated to the media that negative reporting on 
Japan had to stop after the demonstrations in 2005. For example, the CCTV began airing 
documentaries on sympathetic Japanese individuals (Reilly 2012: 184). It also arranged 
closed-door study sessions for China’s leading news web sites, which editors from both more 
commercial and party-led online newspapers were required to attend. The message was clear: 
“don’t feed the fire of anti-Japan sentiments; help us put it out” (Reilly 2012: 183). 
Reilly (2012: 189-195) analyses the effect on these instructions sent to the media, and 
concluded that the negative coverage was significantly higher in the commercial media than 
in the party-led newspapers in 2006 and 2007. This means that even though the discursive 
space narrowed and there was significant signaling from the CCP that this was occurring, the 
commercial media continued to push the boundaries, printing nearly twice as many articles on 
nationalism, militarism, or right-wing strength in Japan than did the party-led newspapers 
(Reilly 2012: 189). In 2008, however, the commercial media started to decrease its negative 
coverage. Reilly (2012: 189) concludes, “The state was eventually successful in shaping the 
tone of the popular newspaper coverage of Japan, though with a significant time delay”. This 
time delay can also be explained by the fact that Shinzo Abe resigned as prime minister in 
Japan in 2007, and Hu Jintao, the Chinese secretary of state, had high expectations for further 
improvement in Sino-Japanese relations under Japan’s new prime minster, Yasuo Fakuda. 
The reason for this expectation was that Fukuda had given a speech emphasizing that “for the 
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sake of Asia’s future, Japan should cooperate with China, and ensure Chin’s stability and 
development” (Weiss 2014: 163). Consequently, the instructions and the signaling effect from 
the CCP are part of the reason for its success in shaping the tone of the newspapers in that 
period, but we also have to consider the ups and downs of the bilateral relationship between 
Japan and China.  
As seen in Reilly’s research, reporting in the commercial media is far more negative than in 
the party-led newspapers, and even when instructions for restraint are sent out, commercial 
media continue pushing for negative coverage. Stockmann’s (2011) research goes further into 
why the commercial media is actually pushing for this. During the anti-Japanese 
demonstration in 2005, Stockmann conducted a survey of media consumption in Beijing. 
Before the major demonstration on April 9, 2005 media coverage was quite free and 
unconstrained. However, after this demonstration strict instructions were issued from the 
Propaganda Department, instructing the media to keep news reporting close to the 
government line (Stockmann 2011: 184). Again, this change of discursive space when it 
comes to Japan should be seen in the context of the CCP’s overall strategy of protest 
management. The CCP took action to mitigate the risk of this demonstration going out of 
control, and subsequently narrowed the discursive space in the Chinese media.  
Stockmann found that press restrictions affected the way readers looked for news during the 
anti-Japanese demonstration. Mostly, the effect was that there was a larger probability that 
readers would seek out news from the Internet, and move away from the commercial and 
party-led newspapers (Stockmann 2011: 191-193). Stockmann’s research shows that press 
restrictions made the average Beijinger “9 % less likely to read newspapers while he holds 
equally negative feelings toward Japan” (Stockmann 2011: 192). In other words, the 
credibility of the newspapers for readers declined and they sought alternative sources of 
information once press restrictions were imposed and the newspapers began reporting more 
positively on Japan.   
This is interesting as it points to a loss in readership by commercialized newspapers once a 
press restriction has been issued to report less negatively on Japan. Instructions from the 
Propaganda Department are therefore equivalent to a loss of profit for news organizations. 
This explains why the commercial media continue to push the boundaries even after the 
Propaganda Department issues instructions and the discursive space narrows, as Reilly’s 
research shows. The commercial media lose readership as well as credibility. This state of 
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affairs creates a definite incentive for the commercialized media in China to continue 
reporting negative sensationalist/nationalist stories on Japan. The statement of an editor from 
the Global Times provides some insight into the way in which the market for negative 
reporting affects journalism:  
“What attracts people most is aggressive reporting and such aggressive reporting will 
give people an impression (of the paper). Sensationalist news reporting attracts 
readers, and it also aids in establishing a media label as people henceforth associate 
these stories with the newspaper” (Stockmann 2013: 170). 
This points to some worrying tendencies in the Chinese media when it comes to reporting on 
Japan and offers further explanation as to motives behind why commercial media are far more 
sensationalist and negative in their reporting on Japan than the official papers.  
 
 
3.4.1.5 Chinese media coverage of the 2012 Diaoyu 
Island-dispute 
 
During the most recent Diaoyu Island dispute, there was an extremely strong reaction from 
China in general, and not surprisingly, the media was very active in this period. The front 
pages of most newspapers on the day after Japan bought the islands where dedicated to the 
dispute. A newspaper from Shanyang had dedicated its entire front page to the Foreign 
Ministry’s statement regarding the purchase and at the end it emphasized in bold text a 
portion of the that statement, which read: “the days when the Chinese people let themselves 
be bullied are gone forever.” The entire statement was encircled with images of bloody 
fingerprints. Reference News stated on their front page that China would not yield to Japan’s 
purchase. Liaoshen Evening Post declared that in a gamble, Japan would lose, implying that 
Japan would lose if this went any further. Qilu Evening News stated that ”there will be 
consequences” (China Digital Times 11.09.2012).  
All the front pages gave a sense of urgency to the defending of the Diaoyu Islands. The 
newspapers were kind of free of reporting on the issue and were clever in the way they often 
used quotes from Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to support their stances. This made it quite 
difficult for the Propaganda department to attack the newspapers for their reporting. 
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One of the most extreme examples of sensationalism during this crisis was the Beijing 
Evening News, which posted this on its official Weibo: 
“We can adapt as times change. If the foreign devils haven’t said the U.S. army won’t 
get involved, what are we doing tying up our own hands and feet? If we don’t even 
have this measure of resolve, we’ll just be blackmailed (ed: Nuclear Blackmail). (…) 
Why waste energy? Skip to the main course and drop an atomic bomb. Simple” (China 
Digital Times 12.09.2012) 
As seen here, the Beijing Evening Times said that China should use its nuclear missiles on 
Japan. This kind of statement is quite extraordinary coming from a newspaper. Even more 
extraordinary is that the Beijing Evening News is quite a successful newspaper in China. It is a 
newspaper that more than 50 % of people from Beijing read daily (Stockmann 2013: 116), 
and on Weibo, the Beijing Evening News has 3 400 221 followers (Weibo 18.04.2014). It is 
also a newspaper that is quite commercialized and relies on advertising as its main income 
(Stockmann 2013: 116). The post on Weibo was however deleted after some time. Whether 
this was done by Weibo or by the Beijing Evening Times is not really known (China Digital 
Times 12.09.2012). However, it is likely that the post was pulled by the paper itself after 
receiving some comments from higher up in the system.  
Looking at different newspapers, I did not find any that examined the reasons why Japan had 
bought the islands in the first place; the move was mostly described as a “decision to 
nationalize the islands”. The fact that Japan bought the islands to hinder Mr. Ishihara from 
purchasing them was never mentioned. Interestingly Global Times reported on Mr. Ishihara 
plans on April 25, 2012. On this date the paper published the following statement: “Ishihara is 
aiming to stir up nationalism in Japan and please the Japanese public by helping the right-
wing group to gain more political power“(Global Times 25.04.2012). However, this report is 
not linked or referred to in September 2012.   
There was also no mention of the important fact that Japan had effectively controlled the 
islands since 1972.  
There were massive anti-Japanese protests that followed the Japanese government’s purchase 
of the islands, and as seen in the chapter on nationalism, the demonstration in 2012 began to 
go out of control. By the anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China on September 18, the 
CCP began to take action to calm the masses. On September 15, strict censorship instructions 
were issued by the Propaganda Department to different media and/or Internet companies:  
 88 
 
“All websites are requested to inspect and clear every forum, blog, Weibo post and 
other form of interactive content of material concerning “mobilizing anti-Japan 
demonstrations, stirring up excitement, rioting and looting” and “the U.S. history of 
purchasing territory.” (China Digital Times 15.09.2012)29 
These censorship instructions to not report on the actual protests and not to stir up excitement 
were followed by most of the media. On September 16, of the print-media in Beijing, 
Qingdao, Changsha, Guangzhou and Xi’an, most of media outlets did not even mention the 
protests and newspapers also began to issue reports urging people to calm down. The Xi’An 
Daily, Xiao Xiang Morning News, Southern Metropolis Daily, and New Express Daily all 
urged people to express their patriotism in a rational matter and on different newspapers’ 
webpage similar cautions were made. On September 17, China Youth Daily published a 
commentary on page one urging people to end the violence and destruction entitled “Only one 
step between Patriotism and Harming Your Country” (Sinocism Newsletter 17.09.2012).  
After the censorship instructions from the Propaganda Department, there was a change of tone 
in the media. This is not surprising, considering the censorship directives did mention that the 
newspapers should not stir up excitement. There was little mention of the big protests, and the 
organization that did mention them urged readers to conduct themselves rationally and 
peacefully. This is noticeable when searching the editorials about the island dispute in Global 
Times from that period. 
The Global Times was, as expected, very active on this issue and it reported quite 
aggressively before the directives were sent out on September 15. On September 12 it 
published a piece stating that Japan was in decline and this fact could spur China into action, 
as power was shifting between the two (Global Times 12.09.2012). This editorial seems 
dangerously close to my definition of aggressive nationalism in the previous section. One 
other editorial suggested that China would not back away from a confrontation:  
China will not shy away if Japan chooses to resort to its military. As friction escalates, 
it is more likely for Japan to retreat in the face of unreliable US security assurances 
and China's strengthened strategic combat capabilities (Global Times 15.09.2015)30. 
                                                          
29 Mentioning US history seems a little out of place. It is not a mistranslation, and it seems to be due to CCP 
concerns that Chinese netizens may have read up on U.S. issues such as the Gadsden Purchase and the Alaska 
purchase. It could be a fear that these purchases might be somehow viewed as “a precedent for the Japanese 
government’s purchase of three of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands” (Keating 2012). 
30 Was written on the 15 September, but it was published extremely early that day. 
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This editorial also pointed out that a confrontation could have a negative effect on the 
economy, but pointed out that “with a high level of support from the public, China is gaining 
the upper hand psychologically in such a contest” (Ibid).  
The editorials also suggested that it was not possible to back down from the issue, and that a 
strong response from China was needed:  
“The dispute over the Diaoyu Islands crisis is clear. China has no choice but to 
respond to Japan's outrageous provocation. This is a vital step for China to consolidate 
its claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas” (Global Times 
14.09.2012).  
After the purchase on September 11, the editorials in the Global Times like the other 
newspapers, failed to inform readers of Japan’s reasons for the purchase, and there appeared 
to be something of a siege mentality and urging China to respond quick and decisive.  
The tone of the editorials changed after the censorship instructions were sent out on the 
September 15th. On September 18 (the day of the anniversary), the Global Times printed a 
series of moderate articles about Chinese nationals living in Japan. Sharply criticizing the 
violence in China during the protests, the contributors calmly praised Japanese society where 
the “people prioritize their personal affairs, and remain focused on their own lives” (Global 
Times 18.09.2012). One other article pointed out how interdependent the two countries’ 
economies actually are, and said that harming Japanese products would also harm China’s 
economy. Another pointed out that the right-wing politicians in Japan who actually started the 
dispute were glad for the chaos in China, since they would gain more support for their policies 
that way (Global Times 18.09.2012). This is actually one of the first editorials I found in 
which the media seemed to be differentiating between right-wing forces and other people in 
Japan.  Another editorial stated that:  
“Demonstrations used to be one way that China dealt with invasion and provocations 
by other countries when it was a weak country. It is still the means through which 
Chinese show their patriotism. Perhaps we should gradually leave such means behind 
us, as China has grown powerful (Global Times 18.09.2012)” 
This continued also after the anniversary. On September 19, an editorial was published in 
which the writer argued that boycotting products from Japan would hurt ordinary Chinese:  
Countermeasures will not only influence the Japanese economy, they will also hurt 
ourselves. Maybe most people are indifferent to this. However, many businessmen 
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who are engaged in trade with Japan will face the risk of bankruptcy. Many workers in 
Japanese enterprises are likely to lose their job (Global Times 19.09.2012). 
Another editorial in Global Times argued that to solve the island dispute you would have to 
take an objective historical stance:  
To resolve territorial disputes, both sides should look back at history and respect the 
truth. We should take an objective attitude toward disputes and not be led astray by 
nationalism or distort history (Global Times 20.09.2012). 
In examining the editorials written in Global Times during the period, there is a noticeable 
change of tone in the editorials pre- and post-September 15, the day the censorship directives 
were issued. In the early stages of the protests, the CCP allowed for expression of nationalism 
and newspapers are publishing quite freely about the issue. They were, however, very clever 
in terms of frequently linking the statements in their reports with quotes from officials, but 
news organizations also went beyond that and began calling for a tougher stance against 
Japan. In Global Times, the editorials were mostly concerned with the possible of a military 
confrontation with Japan, arguing that China would not and should not back away from such a 
confrontation. In examining the editorials in the context of the slogans used in the 
demonstrations in 2012 (previously discussed in the nationalist chapter), we can see that they 
do reflect a similar attitude towards the issue. For example, one editorial in the Global Times 
came close to the definition of aggressive nationalism presented earlier, as it urged China to 
pursue confrontation with Japan, arguing that Japan was weak and suggesting that this was a 
reason to spur China into action.  
After the censorship directives were sent out, the editorials had a very different focus. The 
tone of the media did change after the censorship directives were issued; however, media 
attention was mostly directed towards the demonstrations and has to be seen in the context of 
the CCPs demonstration policy. These reports contain a strong focus on condemning the 
violence of the demonstrations, and urging people to express their patriotism in a more 
peaceful ways.  
There is, however, an important change in focus on the issues that were previously missing 
from the reports. After the censorship directive there was greater focus placed on the 
economic relationship between China and Japan. The newspapers began to evaluate the 
possible economic consequences of a confrontation between China and Japan. This is 
important component in the marketplace of ideas, as the newspapers actually began to suggest 
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to readers the consequences of potential policy decisions.  However, previously omitted facts 
were still not reported on after the censorship instructions were issued. There were more 
references to right-wing forces in Japan in the reports and editorials published during this 
time, but the fact that Mr. Ishihara had tried to buy the islands, and that the Japanese 
government felt that allowing him to buy the islands was a more dangerous outcome for the 
bilateral relationship between China and Japan, was absent from the reports. Nor were any 
discussions of the actual consequences of the purchase presented.  
  
3.5 The Chinese media: a regulator? 
 
Sensationalist and negative coverage of Japan is normal in the Chinese media. This is because 
these issues are very popular with the public; hence, this creates a market pressure for 
negatively slanted nationalistic reporting on Japan. Where these kinds of incentives and 
market pressures exist, it is important that mechanisms in the marketplace of ideas are capable 
of effectively working to mitigate the dangers of myth-making and false arguments. A 
marketplace of ideas is no guarantee against nationalism and other ideas that one may dislike, 
but if these mechanisms are present, they can effectively mitigate the propagation of 
falsifiable nationalist myths and force competing arguments to confront each other, and this 
allows the public to evaluate the foundations of policies and their consequences. 
In China however, market pressure are intensified by the way journalists are employed. Their 
payment, bonuses and promotions are all performance-based, and are contingent on the 
number of readers and amount money they can attract to the newspaper. Playing on 
nationalism is therefore even more attractive than in many normal news environments.   
This affects the reporting on nationalistic issues in China as we have seen in the coverage of 
Japan, and especially after an incident like the 2012 island dispute. Since the media were quite 
unconstrained in the beginning, the commercialized media took advantage of this and 
produced negative and sensationalist news stories. Research done by Reilly (2012) discovered 
that the commercialized media are in general more negative and less balanced in their 
coverage of Japan than the less commercialized party papers. 
In the 2012 island dispute, we witnessed a highly sensationalist and negative news reporting, 
the focus of which was defending the islands and that China should not back down from a 
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military confrontation with Japan. Important facts were not reported on, for example why the 
islands were bought in the first place. 
After September 15, the reporting did change, but not so much in a way for a well-regulated 
marketplace of ideas. The change of focus was mainly aimed at calming people and urging 
them to express their patriotism more peacefully. However, we can argue that the media took 
on a more balanced view after the censorship instructions were sent out and that the media 
were acting in a way that was closer to the role of a regulator in the marketplace of ideas. We 
can see this in the editorials in the Global Times. Many of them were, of course, directly 
aimed at the violence in the demonstrations, but there were also editorials that mentioned the 
economic consequences of a military confrontation, and that this would have effect on 
ordinary Chinese. However, other previously omitted information, such as the fact that Japan 
had effectively controlled the islands since 1972, and that the purchase didn’t necessarily need 
to significantly change the existing situation, and information concerning the reasons why 
Japan decided to buy the islands in the first place, was not mentioned in the reporting prior to 
or following censorship directives. Consequently, more information about the domestic 
political situation in Japan was needed in Chinese newspapers, as this information was central 
to the issue as well as being vital to regular Chinese seeking to actually understand the island 
dispute.  
Democratization in China would lead to the opening up of the discursive space and to a freer 
media. However, this section illustrates that this may not necessarily lead to the outcomes that 
many human rights activists would expect in China, namely that the opening up of the 
discursive space will “reduce the ability of ruling elites to promote nationalist thinking, since 
critics are better able to scrutinize and refute incorrect, dangerous ideas” (Snyder 2000: 56). 
Actually, as seen in this section, it may likely lead to the opposite, as the media 
professionalism has not progressed sufficiently for competition in the marketplace of ideas to 
function correctly. Consequently, an opening up caused by democratization could quite likely 
lead to more sensationalist and nationalistic reporting, in which important facts and balanced 
reporting will probably remain absent from the public debate in China in the early stages of a 
democratization process. Therefore, in light of the findings previously presented, a free media 
early on in a democratization process in China would make war and aggressive foreign policy 
more likely.   
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4.0 Findings  
 
In the preceding chapters, I have examined each of my intervening variables. This chapter 
will evaluate the two hypotheses and summarize my findings. At the end of this chapter, I will 
also indicate topics that need further research.  
4.1 Evaluation of the hypotheses 
  
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion surrounding China’s democratic future and my 
research question was “Will democratization in China lead to a more aggressive foreign 
policy?” From democratization and war-theory, I was able to formulate my intervening 
variables that could be used to examine the potential effect of democratization on China’s 
foreign policy. These variables were threatened elites, rule of law, nationalism, and media. 
These intervening variables were formed into my two hypotheses. My first hypothesis was as 
follows: 
H1:“A weak rule of law, threatened elites, aggressive nationalism and a poorly 
regulated marketplace of ideas will promote an aggressive foreign policy in a 
democratization process in China”.  
My second hypothesis was: 
H2: “A well-developed rule of law and a well-regulated marketplace of ideas will 
hinder an aggressive foreign policy in a democratization process in China” 
To evaluate these hypotheses, I will now go through each intervening variable. 
This paper illustrates that, as in almost all democratizing states, there are some elites and 
social groups in China who would be threatened by democratization, and there are also some 
elites and social groups that would welcome democratization. The fact that there are 
threatened elites by democratization in China does mean that they will potentially attempt 
everything in their power to protect their interests in an environment of political participation. 
However, since they would compete with other threatened elites, and also with elites and 
social groups that would welcome popular participation, the initial phase of democratization 
in China would most likely in a highly competitive environment, and could easily create a 
political impasse between the different elites and social groups.  
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Because of this, there are aspects of China that points towards short-run thinking and the kind 
of reckless policymaking that can lead to wars in a democratization process. Consequently, 
this intervening variable is closer to the value in the first hypothesis. 
The development of a rule of law in China has definitely been impressive since the reforms in 
the end of the 1970s; however, the country still has some way to go before it could be 
concluded that China has an effective conflict resolution mechanism in place. This paper does 
not see the recent trend towards mediation as a “backlash against law,” as some would coin it. 
Rather, the CCP appears to have acknowledged the problems within the legal system and 
inability of its courts to cope with rising conflicts in an increasingly diverse Chinese society. 
Mediation practices have consequently supplemented the courts in China as a conflict 
resolution mechanism, and have been quite successful in doing so. This can be illustrated by 
the high levels of trust placed in the legal institutions in China, and that this trust has not 
diminished following the reintroduction of mediation practices, and the number of cases that 
have been solved successfully through mediation.  
However, the rule of law in China does still have problems that needs to be addressed. Most 
importantly, there is still a degree of vagueness and uncertainty surrounding today’s 
mechanisms and their roles; especially problematic is a lack of a good general framework, 
something that Chinese judges and mediators complain about. In addition, there have been 
problems of enforcing the decisions that have been reached through mediation and courts. 
Vagueness, uncertainty and problems with enforcement are all issues the CCP has 
acknowledged as problematic, and the party has moved to address these factors in recent 
years. However, the steps that have been taken to address these matters are still quite fresh 
and “young”, and we do not yet know how effective they may be. Because of this, this paper 
concludes that China has a somewhat weak rule of law when it comes the question of whether 
the nation possesses an effective conflict resolution mechanism. Consequently, this 
intervening variable is closer to the value in the first hypothesis than the value in the second 
hypothesis. However, the development of a rule of law is not that far from that required for 
the nation’s justice system to be considered an effective conflict resolution mechanism, and it 
will be exciting to observe how China can address the issues of its legal system in the future.  
As a side note, my analysis of the development of a rule of law in China does illustrates how 
important definitions are. This paper does have a very thin definition and criteria for a rule of 
law, relying on Huntington and Fuller. Consequently, my conclusion of the development of 
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the rule of law in China is quite positive, even though I do not see it as fulfilling the definition 
and criteria set up in this paper, but it is seen as not that far off this. I am, however, fully 
aware of having a thin and basic definition of a rule of law, in this context. Were I to use a 
thicker definition of a rule of law, this view would probably not be as “positive”, and I would 
be closer to many scholars who hold more negative views of the recent development of the 
rule of law in China.  
This difference in definitions probably also illustrate the huge difference in the quantitative 
data on the rule of law in China, and on its institutional strength in general. Data that have a 
thicker definition of a rule of law would score China lower on this development than data that 
have a thinner definition. Therefore, since the data from the Worldwide Governance Indicator 
is the mean of several evaluations and different definitions, it may, indeed, be is a good 
indicator of the development of the rule of law. However, the failure of these datasets to 
include their methodology is problematic when doing this kind of analysis, and consequently I 
stand by my decision not to build my paper on this data.  
The analysis of the rule of law in China also points towards a necessary improvement of the 
democratization and war-theory. As pointed out earlier, the definition of a rule of law is often 
omitted in the debates on democratization and war, and in the sequencing debate. What is 
required here is an examination of the development of a rule of law, to see what kind of rule 
of law is best suited to a nation prior to democratization. Does it need to function as a conflict 
resolution mechanism as this paper sees it, or do we need a thicker version of the rule of law 
for it to successfully mitigate the dangers of democratization? These are questions that need to 
be addressed in future research.  
 
When it comes to the intervening variable of nationalism, the preceding chapter illustrated 
that nationalism is an increasingly attractive idea in China. This paper illustrates that the 
change of the historical narrative arising from the legitimacy problem faced by the CCP in the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution has greatly contributed to the rise of nationalism in 
today’s China. However, nationalism was present in Chinese society even before this, but the 
change in narrative and the Patriotic Education Campaign served as indicators that 
nationalism was now an accepted idea in the Chinese society.   
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Today, nationalism in China is a complex interplay between the nationalism promoted by the 
CCP and popular nationalism, and the chapter shows that the CCP currently struggles to keep 
up with nationalistic demands. For elites and social groups in a democratization process in 
China, it would be extremely attractive to play the nationalist card.  
However, playing the nationalist card is also very dangerous in China. Chinese nationalism 
has a strong anti-Japanese view, and this fits well with this thesis’s definition of aggressive 
nationalism. Chinese nationalism portrays Japan as more threatening and more culpable for 
historic wrongs, and nationalists tend to have an optimistic view of the outcome of a possible 
military confrontation with Japan. 
The demonstrations in China, as well as other nationalistic actions, show how Chinese 
nationalists view Japan through this historical lens and that they are pushing the CCP for a 
stronger stance towards Japan. During the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012, the historical 
issue was central to many of the slogans used by popular nationalists. There seems to be a 
lack of differentiation between past transgressions committed by Japan during WWII, and 
contemporary Japan. During the demonstrations, slogans with historical content, such as 
references to the Nanjing Massacre, were quite common. Consequently, the bilateral 
relationship between Japan and China is always viewed through this historical lens by 
nationalists in China.  
The anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012 also illustrate how the popular nationalism is 
pushing the CCP’s stance on nationalistic issues and how the CCP are struggling to keep up 
with popular demand. During the demonstrations, the nationalists argued that China should 
take a stronger stance towards Japan and urged for example China to send soldiers to the 
islands. The slogans illustrates how the nationalists were pushing for a stronger reaction from 
China towards Japan on the island dispute.  
Consequently, the analysis in this thesis shows that Chinese nationalism has some aggressive 
traits towards Japan, and the intervening variable places itself close to the value in my main 
hypothesis.   
Some would say that nationalistic demonstrations in China could be overestimated, as people 
take advantage of these demonstrations to protest against domestic issues. If this is the case, 
then nationalistic demonstrations as a measurement of nationalism can be skewed. However, 
the findings of this paper show that the overwhelming majority of the people in these 
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demonstrations promoted nationalist slogans, suggesting nationalistic motivations, and only a 
few slogans used during the demonstrations were non-nationalistic and directed towards 
domestic politics, ideologies and representative figures.  
As is the case with many sectors of contemporary China, the media in China have 
experienced an incredible transformation since the economic reforms at the end of the 1970s. 
This paper has focused on the commercialization of the media and the way in which the CCP 
has managed this transformation inside its censorship apparatus. The proceeding chapter 
illustrates that the media is in no way “free”, and that censorship in form of for example self-
censorship is quite effective in China. However, there has been a partial freeing in that there 
has been an opening up of discursive space in the Chinese media in some areas. Foreign 
affairs are one of the areas where the media is actually quite free in the beginning to report on.  
This paper does see the rise of investigative journalism as one of the major sources of 
professionalism in the Chinese media, since investigative journalism has introduced some 
important norms and values enabling the media to potentially act as a regulatory mechanism 
in the marketplace of ideas. These are the notions of truth and fact seeking, as well as the 
notion of objective and balanced reporting. However, this thesis show that these kinds of 
values and norms have not taken hold when reporting on nationalistic issues with Japan. 
When reporting on nationalistic issues, such as the island-dispute in 2012, the commercialized 
newspapers reported on this quite aggressively. Early on, when the reporting was quite “free”, 
these papers failed to provide the readers with important fact regarding the island dispute. 
Most importantly, the reason for Japan’s decision to buy the islands was never discussed. 
These aspects of the reporting of this incident are problematic, as reporting on why Japan had 
bought the islands may have led to more constructive discussions of the purchase actually 
meant and what would actually change as a result of the purchase. There was also no mention 
of the fact that Japan has had effective administrative control of the islands since 1972. 
Instead, the consequences of a military confrontation with Japan was mentioned, but the 
newspapers wrote that Japan would probably back down because of the unreliable security 
assurances from the US, and also because of change in the power of balance between China 
and Japan. An examination of the editorials in the Global Times revealed that they actually 
conveyed the impression that a military confrontation with Japan was more than a possible 
outcome, and that China would win such a confrontation with not much of a problem.  
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Moreover, an examination of the reporting before the censorship directives were issued on 
September 15 reveals that the tone of the reports it is quite similar to this paper’s definition of 
aggressive nationalism. The newspapers did portray Japan as “more threatening, more 
implacable, more culpable for historic wrongs, yet also more easily countered by resolute 
opposition than they really were” (Snyder 2000: 67). Consequently, the focus of the 
commercialized newspapers in this period was obviously to sell to a market in which there 
existed a large demand for nationalistic reporting. Selling was one obvious factor influencing 
the tone of the reports, as we can see by many quotes from editors and journalists in this 
thesis. However, it may also be the case that the tone of the reporting was close to the 
definition of aggressive nationalism because the journalists themselves shared many of the 
nationalistic feelings that were apparent during the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012.   
After the censorship directives were sent out, the media reports on the islands dispute were 
not as sensationalist or aggressive as they had been before September 15, and this has to be 
understood in the context of the CCP’s policy regarding mass demonstrations. However, 
previously omitted facts were still not reported on. Information about the domestic political 
situation in Japan was needed in Chinese newspapers as this information was central to the 
issue and also central for regular Chinese to actually understand the island-dispute, however 
this was largely not reported on before or after the censorship instructions were issued.  
The media did however report on the economic consequences of a confrontation with Japan, 
and pointed out that this was less than ideal for both nations. Because of this, we can argue 
that the media took on a more balanced view after the CCP’s censorship directives were 
issued and, at this point, was acting in a manner that was closer to the role of a regulator in the 
marketplace of ideas than it had been functioning prior to September 15, but it was far from 
the role regulatory role of media prescribed in democratization and war-theory. The 
professionalism of the Chinese media has therefore not progressed sufficiently for 
competition in the marketplace of ideas to function properly. As previously mentioned, a 
marketplace of ideas can’t be a check towards nationalism, but it can hinder inaccuracy and 
mythmaking to take place. The weakness of the Chinese journalists towards the market 
pressure can consequently pose difficulties as sometimes the pressure in the market will be 
towards for example inaccurate nationalistic reporting that can contribute to elite 
mythmaking. To report balanced and accurate in these situations are central in the idea of a 
well-regulated marketplace of ideas, and that is what the Chinese media failed to do during 
the island-dispute in 2012. 
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This paper therefore concludes that the media is far from the role of a regulator in the 
marketplace of ideas in China. An opening up of the discursive space and a freer media will 
therefore occur in a context of a weak regulated marketplace of ideas.  
The analysis in this paper finds stronger support for my first hypothesis than my second 
hypothesis. China has a threatened elite, a somewhat weak rule of law, trait of aggressive 
nationalism, and a media that is currently incapably of functioning as a regulator in the 
marketplace of ideas. This thesis consequently points out that in the event of an opening up 
for public participation in the form of holding free and fair elections in today’s China runs a 
high risk of promoting aggressive foreign policy and could possibly lead to war, most likely 
with Japan.  
In this thesis, I have chosen the intervening variables with democratization and war-theory in 
mind. However, democratization is a complex social and political phenomenon and there are 
probably other variables that need to be included in democratization and war-theory that could 
explain the effect democratization has on foreign policy, and which are not included in this 
thesis 
One mechanism that is interesting in this context, and something which I feel the need to 
address, is economic interdependence. Economic interdependence as a mechanism that can 
possible mitigate the danger of democratization is definitely an area that needs more attention, 
and is a concept could have been a theoretical competing hypothesis in this thesis. Research 
by Jennifer Lind (2011) and by Wooten (2007) shows some promising mitigation effects that 
economic interdependence may have on democratization. Lind found that in past transitions in 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, economic interdependence had a pacifying effect (Lind 
2011: 427). Wooten (2007) examined Argentina, Brazil, Azerbaijan and Armenia. In his 
analysis, he found that in Azerbaijan and Armenia, there was no economic relationship 
between the two countries prior to them both going through a democratization process, which 
eventually lead to a war between the two countries (Wooten 2007: 64-69). In contrast, in the 
democratization process in Brazil and Argentina, economic interdependence was a strong 
pacifying element between the two countries (Ibid).  
The possible pacifying effect that economic interdependence may have on democratization 
seems promising, and consequently it could also provide a strong pacifying effect on 
democratization in China and the likelihood of the nation potentially going to war with Japan, 
since Japan is currently China’s second most important import partner and Chinas third most 
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important export partner (CIA 2014). However the theory of economic interdependence in the 
context of democratization and war-theory has not yet received sufficient attention and 
requires further development; therefore, it has not been added to this thesis. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
 
This aim of this paper is to examine whether democratization in China could potentially lead 
to a more aggressive foreign policy. I have found evidence that on balance supports my first 
hypothesis that threatened elites, China’s weak rule of law, aggressive nationalism, and poorly 
regulated marketplace of ideas will promote aggressive foreign policy should a 
democratization process take place in China.  
This is quite a negative view of the potential democratization in China, and the question may 
arise as to whether this thesis argues that China should never democratize. Is democracy in 
China a bad idea? This is obviously not the case. A mature and functional democracy in China 
would be better from a global perspective, but most importantly, it would be better for the 
people of China. However, the discussion on how to get there is important, as this thesis 
illustrates.  
As Shambaugh (2015) recently wrote in an article in the Wall Street Journal, “the CCP is the 
world’s second-longest ruling regime (behind only North Korea), and no party can rule 
forever”. If this is true, let us hope that the current regime does not implode and that China 
would go on the path of democratization just yet, because the world may not like what the 
consequences it could potentially bring at the present moment in the nation’s history.  
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